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“Many remark, justice is blind;
pity those in her sway, shocked to discover she is also deaf.”
David Mamet, Faustus
ABSTRACT
In recent years a number of high-profile disqualification decisions have
caught the attention of the legal community and the public at large. The most
notable instances have involved Justices sitting on the United States Supreme
Court, including calls by members of Congress and the legal academy for
Justices Kagan and Thomas to step aside in the appeal challenging the
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act. In addition, a motion to disqualify
the homosexual state court judge in the dispute regarding the constitutionality
of California’s Proposition 8 which bans gay marriage, and the defense
motion to disqualify the judge overseeing the trial of George Zimmerman for
the murder of Trayvon Martin both engendered disagreements about the
proper bounds of disqualification practice and judge shopping. Of course,
there is the Caperton case—an epic battle over disqualification of a state
supreme court justice in an appeal involving a stakeholder who provided
significant campaign support to the jurist—which resulted in a landmark
opinion on recusal standards from the United States Supreme Court.
Each of these disqualification cases is different in respect of the underlying
causes of action and the type of relationships or other facts that suggest
possible judicial bias. But in each case, the jurist whose impartiality was
challenged was the person who, at least initially, decided whether he was
biased and in each case the request to step aside was denied. Often the jurist’s
decision to remain on the case was made with no satisfactory explanation and
few, if any, other procedural protections. While in some cases the jurist may be
guilty of a less than honest response to the recusal request, in most cases the
judge likely is genuinely—though perhaps naïvely—convinced of his
impartiality. Nevertheless, most of these decisions to remain on the case have
been met with dismay by the litigants, scorn and ridicule from the media and
the public at large, and, at best, skepticism from many within the legal
academy. These negative reactions to the jurists’ decisions they are not
disqualified reflect a disconnect between the way the challenged jurist
perceives his own bias and the perception of others, including the litigants, the
media, and the public.
This asymmetry in perceptions of bias between self and other is confirmed
by recent research in cognition and social psychology that reveals we all suffer
from a Bias Blind Spot. In other words, we don’t see our own biases—but we
are quick to infer and even exaggerate bias in others. This Bias Blind Spot has
three primary causes: (1) self-enhancement and self-interest motives; (2) the
differing “evidence” of bias used to evaluate bias in self and bias in others;
and (3) Naïve Realism. Each of these three phenomenon helps explain the
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differing perspectives of challenged jurists and the public regarding judicial
bias in specific cases. Also, these perceptions and misperceptions of bias can
create a confrontational atmosphere that increasingly surrounds some high
stakes disqualification disputes. Thus, understanding our Bias Blind Spot can
help reshape the disqualification debate—both with regard to making
disqualification decisions in individual cases and adopting system-wide
reforms.
To accomplish these goals, this Article uses the Caperton case as an
exemplar of how the Bias Blind Spot affects disqualification decisions, and to
explain why new disqualification procedures that correct for this Bias Blind
Spot must be adopted to protect litigants fundamental rights and to ensure
continued public confidence in the judiciary. Part I briefly explains the
importance of impartial judges in our legal system and the historical
presumption of impartiality that permits the subject judge or justice to make a
decision on his own disqualification with few, if any, other procedural
protections. Also, in this section specific aspects of current disqualification
practice are examined to help understand how the substantive and procedural
standards working together increase the chances that jurists will make
mistakes when deciding whether they must step aside. In Part II, the findings of
recent social science research into the Bias Blind Spot and related cognitive
illusions that are likely to affect disqualification disputes are explored. In Part
III, the opinions of all three challenged West Virginia State Supreme Court
Justices—Benjamin, Maynard, and Starcher—are analyzed to reveal exactly
how the Bias Blind Spot likely shaped these decisions. This detailed review of
what happened in Caperton exposes the flaws of current practice that permits
the challenged jurist to decide his own disqualification dispute. In Part IV, this
Article proposes that the best way to compensate for the effect of the Bias
Blind Spot in disqualification decisions is to adopt procedural reforms that
prevent the challenged jurist from being the decision maker in such disputes.
This section also explores some of the more serious objections raised to the
proposed procedural reforms. Based upon this analysis, the Article ends with a
Conclusion that if we want to protect individual litigants’ fundamental rights
to a fair trial before a fair tribunal and preserve public confidence in our
courts, then we must consider the cognitive illusions that affect decision
making and refocus recusal reform on changing disqualification procedures in
order to counter the effects of the Bias Blind Spot.
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I. PRESUMPTIONS AND PERCEPTIONS OF JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY
“Justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.”
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954)
A.

The Importance Of Judicial Impartiality

“It is axiomatic that ‘[a] fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of
due process.’”1 This mandate of fairness means not only that the procedures
used in the trial must be impartial—but also the decision maker must not be
biased for or against a party or have prejudged the case.2 The requirement of
judicial impartiality is designed to produce just results in individual cases, as
well as to promote public confidence in the justice system.3 The public must be
confident that the judiciary is a legitimate institution in order to secure
widespread compliance with court rulings, especially those that are
unfavorable with a significant part of the citizenry.4 The legitimacy of the
judicial branch depends more heavily on public confidence in the institution
because, unlike the other two branches of government, the courts have “no
influence over either the sword or the purse[.]”5 The judiciary creates public
confidence in the legitimacy of the institution in a number of ways, including
the use of fair procedures.6 When people evaluate the procedural fairness of
institutions, like the courts, they are “especially influenced by evidence of
even-handedness, factuality, and the lack of bias or favoritism (neutrality).”7 In
other words, impartiality is a key component of how people assess the
procedural fairness and, in turn, the legitimacy of the judiciary. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the importance of public confidence
to maintaining the authority of the judiciary in our democracy.8 In fact, the
requirement of an impartial judiciary has “been jealously guarded”9 by the
Supreme Court.

1. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (quoting In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
2. Generally, the term “impartial” means “not favoring one side or party more than another;
without prejudice or bias.” Webster’s New World College Dictionary (Wiley Publishing 2010).
The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct defines impartial as the “absence of bias or prejudice
in favor of, or against, particular parties or classes of parties, as well as maintenance of an open
mind in considering issues that may come before a judge.” MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT
3 (2011) available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/profession
al_responsibility/2011_mcjc_preamble_scope_terminology.authcheckdam.pdf.
3. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136 (declaring that “fairness of course requires an
absence of actual bias in the trial of cases” and that “our system of law has always endeavored to
prevent even the probability of unfairness.”).
4. See Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN.
REV. PSYCHOL. 375 (2006) (explaining that legitimate actors and institutions can more effectively
and efficiently shape the behavior of citizens without the need to use rewards or threats and law-
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Procedural and Other Safeguards Protecting Judicial Impartiality

Given the important role that impartiality plays in legitimating the exercise
of judicial power, the federal government and the states historically have relied
upon a number of procedures to protect judicial impartiality.10 First, the
process of selecting judges in both the federal11 and state court12 systems is
designed to ensure that jurists do not prejudge the cases or issues that might

related actors and institutions are legitimized through a number of means, including the use of fair
procedures).
5. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, 490 (Alexander Hamilton) (Benjamin Fletcher Wright ed.,
1974); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s
authority—possessed of neither the purse nor the sword—ultimately rests on sustained public
confidence in its moral sanction.”).
6. Tom R. Tyler, A Psychological Perspective on the Legitimacy of Institutions and
Authorities, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON IDEOLOGY,
JUSTICE, AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 416, 422 (John T. Jost & Brenda Major eds., 2001).
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980) (declaring the need to
preserve “both the appearance and reality of fairness,” which “‘generat[es] the feeling so
important to popular government, that justice has been done’ . . . by ensuring that no person will
be deprived of his interests in the absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with
assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him.”) (citations omitted); In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (finding that an impartial judge is necessary to maintain the
legitimacy of court proceedings).
9. Marshall, 446 U.S. at 242.
10. Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex Perschbacher, The Elusive Goal of Impartiality, 97 IOWA L.
REV. 181, 195–96 (2011) (stating that judicial impartiality is protected by four distinct procedural
safeguards, including disqualification); see also, Amanda Frost, Keeping Up Appearances: A
Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 555–66 (2005)
(describing five key procedural protections that result in legitimate judicial decisions, including
impartial decision makers).
11. In the federal court system, Supreme Court justices, court of appeals judges, and district
court judges—who are appointed for life—are nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate using a process that is designed to determine the nominee’s suitability for judicial office.
UNITED STATES COURTS, Federal Courts In American Government, http://www.uscourts.gov/
FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/FederalCourtsInAmericanGovernment.aspx (last
visited Apr. 19, 2013).
12. Over the years, states have adopted various systems for selecting members of the
judiciary: appointment, merit selection, and election. In addition, states have changed those
methods when judicial independence and impartiality were seriously threatened. In states that
elect some or all of their judicial officers, judicial ethics codes and other laws have established
restrictions on judicial campaign contribution solicitations, campaign promises, pledges, and
commitments regarding cases likely to come before the courts, as well as limiting other forms of
campaign conduct. JOHN L. DODD ET AL., THE FEDERALIST SOCIETY, THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL
APPOINTMENTS (January 1, 2003), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/thecase-for-judicial-appointments.
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come before them on the bench. Second, all federal,13 and most state,14 court
judges take oaths of office in which they swear to be impartial in discharging
their judicial duties. Third, most, if not all, judicial proceedings are conducted
in the public view and follow other procedures designed to protect the process
of fair adjudication.15 Fourth, in most cases, litigants may obtain appellate
review of the procedures used and the rulings made that may have deprived
them of a fair trial.16 Fifth, litigants have the right to seek disqualification of a
judge who actually is not, or probably is not, impartial.17 Sixth, in more
extreme cases, judicial officers can be impeached, suspended or otherwise
disciplined for transgressions related to failings of impartiality.18 Of course,
“these procedures work together: none, standing alone, is considered sufficient
to guarantee fairness and impartiality.”19
However, some of these safeguards are being challenged in ways that are
likely to erode judicial impartiality and jeopardize the legitimacy of this
important branch of government. In recent years, the siege has come from
politically motivated citizens, special interest groups, other branches of
government, and even other judges.20 The attacks take the form of new laws
purporting to strip courts of jurisdiction to hear controversial cases,21 use of
pre-election surveys to solicit commitments from judicial candidates on
specific disputed legal issues,22 and the proposed elimination of judicial

13. 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2006) (“Each justice or judge of the United States shall take the
following oath or affirmation before performing the duties of his office: ‘I, _______ _______, do
solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal
right to the poor and to the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge and perform
all duties incumbent upon me as _____________ under the Constitution and laws of the United
States. So help me God.”).
14. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1.212(2) (West 2012) (“I, ____________, do solemnly
swear (or affirm) that I will support the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of
the State of Oregon, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of a judge of the
______________ (court), according to the best of my ability, and that I will not accept any other
office, except judicial offices, during the term for which I have been ________ (elected or
appointed).”).
15. Bassett & Perschbacher, supra 10, at 196.
16. Id.
17. RICHARD E. FLAMM, JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION: RECUSAL AND DISQUALIFICATION
OF JUDGES, §§ 5.1–5.2 at 103–08 (2d ed. 2007).
18. See Jeffrey Stempel, Impeach Brent Benjamin Now!? Giving Adequate Attention to the
Failings of Judicial Impartiality, 47 SAN DIEGO L. REV 1, 65–66 (2010) (suggesting that
impeachment is warranted in certain cases of repeated or egregious failure to recuse).
19. Bassett & Perschbacher, supra 10, at 196.
20. See, e.g., Sandra Day O’Connor, The Threat to Judicial Independence, WALL ST. J., Sept
27, 2006, at A18.
21. See id.
22. JAMES STAPLES ET AL., THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 2006: HOW 2006
WAS THE MOST THREATENING YEAR YET TO THE FAIRNESS AND IMPARTIALITY OF OUR
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immunity for official actions and personal intimidation of judicial officers.23 In
addition, a growing number of state legislatures have proposed other politically
motivated reforms that would impact the independence and impartiality of the
courts affecting: (1) court’s budgets and finances; (2) methods of selecting
judges; and (3) changing the structure of the court system.24 Finally, the
independence and impartiality of state judicial officers are being undermined
by the influence of big money and politics in the selection and retention of
state court judges25—who hear and decide most of the cases in our legal
system.26
These changes mean that in all courts, and certainly those in states where
judges and justices are elected (which is the majority of states),27 safeguards
other than the method of selection will be increasingly important to
maintaining judicial impartiality. Most of those other safeguards—including
the oath of office, the public nature of litigation, the impartial procedures used
to decide cases, and the right of appellate review—are not likely to be
modified to meet the new challenges to impartiality created by more political
judicial elections. In addition, although in theory impeachment or other
removal methods28 are available to address improper refusals to recuse—they
are seldom used and often are cumbersome.29 Rather, the right to disqualify a

COURTS–AND HOW AMERICANS ARE FIGHTING BACK 29, available at http://www.brennan
center.org/content/resource/the_new_politics_of_judicial_elections_2006.
23. See O’Connor, supra note 20.
24. Courts under attack, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, http://www.ajs.org/ajs/ajs_edi
torial-template.asp?content_id=987 (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
25. STAPLES ET AL., supra note 22, at 29.
26. What Federal Courts Do – Which Courts Handle More Cases?, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/federal/courts.nsf/autoframe?OpenForm&nav=menu2e&page=/feder
ral/courts.nsf/page/5DD5E0A65BA87BCA8525682400517BA5?opendocument (last visited Apr.
8, 2013).
27. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATE APPELLATE AND
GENERAL COURTS (2010), available at http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/
Judicial_Selection_Charts_1196376173077.pdf (reflecting that while fifteen states use merit
selection panels for appointment of some judges, thirty-nine states, including some states that use
merit panels for initial selection, still elect some of their judges in either partisan or nonpartisan
contests).
28. In nearly all fifty states, the constitution includes the power to impeach a jurist. In most
states, that power usually is controlled and exercised by the state’s highest court working with the
state’s judicial conduct organization. In other states, removal is effected through legislative
address or a recall election. Methods of Removing State Judges, AMERICAN JUDICATURE
SOCIETY, http://www.ajs.org/ethics/eth_impeachement.asp (last visited Apr. 8, 2013). Of course,
the litigant whose rights may be affected is not similarly empowered to call for the impeachment
or other discipline of a jurist who is not sufficiently impartial. However, in states where judges
and justices are elected—the litigant may take part in the political process to remove a specific
jurist from office when he or she must stand for re-election or is the subject of a recall. Id.
29. Stempel, supra note 18, at 63-65.
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judge or justice who is biased is the most—and in some cases only—effective
way to address the problem of lack of impartiality.30 Thus, disqualification
standards and procedures will play an increasingly important role in not just
protecting individual litigant’s rights, but in preserving the public confidence
in the legitimacy of the judiciary as a whole.
C. Differing Presumptions About Judicial Impartiality
Although judicial impartiality standards come from three basic sources—
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, federal and state
adopted codes of judicial conduct, and federal and state statutory laws31—only
one standard applies to all federal and state courts: the Due Process Clause.32
Until recently, the Supreme Court of the United States had held that
the Federal Due Process Clause requires disqualification of a judge [in only
two situations]: when the judge has a financial interest in the outcome of the
case, and when the judge is trying a defendant for certain criminal contempts
[where the judge had participated in an earlier proceeding involving the
33
contemptor or was the target of the contemptible conduct].

All other possible bases for judicial disqualification, including “matters of
kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem
generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion”34 and, as such, did not
rise to a constitutional level. Thus, the Due Process Clause, as applied before
Caperton, mandated disqualification only in very limited instances.
This narrow view of judicial impartiality, upon which the Due Process
standard for disqualification is based, originates from the eighteenth century
English common law, which was summed up by Sir Edward Coke in a single
pithy principle: “quiaaliquis non debet esse Judex in propria causa”35 or “no
man shall be a judge in his own cause.” This seemingly simple rule of
disqualification is grounded in a strong presumption of judicial impartiality.36

30. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Calderia, Campaign Support, Conflicts of Interest, and
Judicial Impartiality 20 (July 2, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.cam
paignfreedom.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/Gibson-2009-Judicial-Public-Opinion.pdf (study
showing that the negative effects of campaign support on perceptions of judicial impartiality can
be rehabilitated significantly through recusals, but disqualification does not restore legitimacy to
the levels found when no conflict of interest exists).
31. Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 10, at 189–93 (identifying and explaining the three
sources of legal standards applicable to disqualification motions).
32. See id.
33. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 890 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
34. Id. at 892.
35. Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1609) 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B.).
36. E.g., John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609–12 (1947)
(noting that “English common law practice at the time of the establishment of the American court
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While the English common law standard is quiet narrow, some older judicial
systems—including the Jewish legal system,37 Christian canonical laws,38 and
Roman law39—did permit parties to petition for the disqualification of jurists
based upon a mere suspicion or appearance of bias. This more expansive view
of disqualification was grounded in a presumption that judges—being
human—are not immune to bias.40
While there is some evidence that this more expansive view was the
practice in the early English courts,41 that was not true at the time the
American legal system was established. Instead, when our nation was founded,
English common law—unlike the civil law and canonical law—severely
limited the grounds for disqualification of judges:
By the laws of England also, in the times of Bracton and Fleta, a judge might
be refused for good cause; but now the law is otherwise, and it is held that
judges or justices cannot be challenged. For the law will not suppose a
possibility of bias or favour in a judge who is already sworn to administer
impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption
42
and idea.

was simple in the extreme. Judges disqualified for financial interest. No other disqualifications
were permitted, and bias, today the most controversial ground for disqualification, was rejected
entirely.”); Richard E. Flamm, History of and Problems with the Federal Judicial
Disqualification Framework, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 751, 753–55 (2010) (explaining that William
Blackstone influenced English Parliament to adopt a disqualification standard that required
pecuniary interest in the cause—thereby rejecting Bracton’s suggestion that judges should be
disqualified on even a suspicion of bias).
37. See, e.g., FLAMM, supra note 17, at §1.2, at 6; EMANUEL QUINT & NEIL HECHT, 1
JEWISH JURISPRUDENCE 6 (1980) (“Every judge who judges a case with complete fairness, even
for a single hour is credited by the Torah as though he had become a partner to the Holy One . . .
in the work of creation.” (citing Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Shabbath 10a (n.d.)).
38. Harrington Putnam, Recusation, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 6 (1923) (the Cornell Law Quarterly
is currently published as the Cornell Law Review).
39. Id. at 3, n.10 (1923) (translating Codex of Justinian, Book III, Title 1, No. 16 “It is the
clearest right under general provisions laid down from thy exalted seat, that before hearings
litigants may recuse judges. A judge being recused, the parties have to resort to chosen
arbitrators, before whom they assert their rights. Although a judge has been appointed by imperial
power yet because it is our pleasure that all litigations shall proceed without suspicion, let it be
permitted to him, who thinks the judge under suspicion to recuse him before the issue be joined,
so that cause go to another; the right to recuse having been held out to him .”); see also Fred
Blume’s Justinian Code Translation, available at http://uwacadweb.uwyo.edu/blume&justinian/
Code%20Revisions/Book3rev%20copy/Book%203-1rev.pdf.
40. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Disqualification Matters. Again., 30 REV. LITIG.
671, 699 (2011).
41. See HENRY DE BRACTON, BRACTON DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETDINBUS ANGLIEA 281
(George E. Woodbine ed., Yale Univ. Press 1942) (suggesting that a judge should recuse when he
is related to a party, hostile to a party, or has been counsel in a case).
42. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 361 (Oxford at
Clarendon Press 1768).
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Blackstone went on to observe that if this strong presumption of impartiality
proved to be wrong, then the judge could be impeached or otherwise held
“accountable for his conduct.” 43
In other words, it was not the case that impartiality did not matter—rather
it was presumed the judge would be impartial as that was central to the role of
the common law judge. In fact, impartiality seems to have been critical to the
self-identity of the common law judge—as reflected in other English common
law sources regarding judicial conduct.44 One such source is Sir Matthew
Hale’s list of “Things Necessary to be Continually Had in Remembrance”—a
set of rules established for his own conduct as a common law judge.45 Of the
eighteen standards of conduct enumerated as essential for judicial conduct, at
least seven points addressed the need for the jurist to be and remain impartial.46
Given this strong presumption of impartiality and the critical role it plays in
judicial identity, to “challenge a judge for bias was, in effect, to accuse him of
abdicating his role—an accusation the common law courts simply would not
tolerate.”47 Thus, the grounds for removal of an English common law jurist
were quite limited: “a judge was disqualified for direct pecuniary interest and
for nothing else.”48
D. Shifting Disqualification Standards
However, since the English common law rule on recusal was first adopted
in America, the principle has slowly, but steadily, been expanded to include
more instances when disqualification is merited. The substantive standards for
disqualification throughout the federal and state court systems have been
modified (through legislative enactments and adoption of judicial ethics rules,
as well as common law) in, at least, three important ways.49 First, the grounds

43. Id.
44. Geyh, supra note 40, at 677–79.
45. See 2 LORD J. CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 207–09 (James
Cockcroft & Co. 1881) (quoting Sir Matthew Hale’s “Things Necessary to be Continually Had in
Remembrance”).
46. The seven rules regarding judicial impartiality laid down by Sir Matthew Hale are: “4.
That in the execution of justice I carefully lay aside my own passions . . . . 6. That I suffer not
myself to be prepossessed with any judgment at all, till the whole business, and both parties be
heard. 7. That I never engage myself in the beginning of any cause, but reserve myself
unprejudiced till the whole be heard . . . . 10. That I be not biased [sic] with compassion to the
poor, or favor to the rich . . . . 11. That popular or court applause, or distaste, have no influence
into anything I do in point of distribution of justice. 12. Not to be solicitous of what men will say
or think, so long as I keep myself exactly according to the rules of justice . . . . 16. To abhor all
private solicitations . . . in matters depending.” Id. at 208.
47. Geyh, supra note 40, at 679.
48. Frank, supra note 36, at 609.
49. Deborah Goldberb et al., The Best Defense: Why Elected Courts Should Lead Recusal
Reform, 46 WASHBURN L.J. 503, 513 (2007).
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for disqualification have been enlarged beyond mere pecuniary interest to
include partiality, extra judicial knowledge of disputed facts, and judicial
misconduct.50 Second, the standard has evolved from one requiring a showing
of actual bias to one requiring only an appearance of bias.51 Third, the jurist is
now tasked with evaluating claims of bias under an objective test rather than a
subjective standard.52 Taken together, these changes represent a significant
shift from the original and rather narrow “no man shall be a judge in his own
cause” standard, which resulted in disqualification only when the jurist had a
direct pecuniary interest in the case.
This liberalization of the rules for recusal also is reflected in a series of
United States Supreme Court cases applying the Due Process Clause to
disqualification disputes. First, the types of disqualifying factors have been
expanded to encompass not just a direct pecuniary interest—but indirect
pecuniary interests53 and instances of partiality, as well.54 Second, the standard
has shifted from one of actual bias to a lesser showing—a probability of bias,
which is akin to an appearance of bias standard.55 Third, the grounds for
disqualification are evaluated from the perspective of someone other than the
judge—making it an objective test rather than being a subjective inquiry.56 All
three of these changes are reflected in Caperton,57 the most recent
pronouncement by the United States Supreme Court regarding when Due
Process requires recusal.
In fact, the Due Process standard for disqualification elucidated by the
majority in Caperton mandates recusal when:
there is a serious risk of actual bias—based upon objective and reasonable
perceptions when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the case by

50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See generally Aetna Life Ins. Co, v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 812 (1986) (holding recusal
required when state supreme court justice cast deciding vote upholding punitive damage award
against insurer when justice was plaintiff in nearly identical suit pending in lower courts); Ward
v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (holding mayor was disqualified from adjudicating fines for
legal infractions because mayor was executive responsible for town’s finances).
54. See generally In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (holding that judge cannot preside
over a subsequent contempt hearing after serving as a one man judge and grand jury in earlier
proceeding against same defendant).
55. Id. at 136 (“Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But
our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.”).
56. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 475 U.S. at 822 (the inquiry is whether the “situation is one ‘which
would offer a possible temptation to the average . . . judge to . . . lead him not to hold the balance
nice, clear, and true.’” (citing Ward, 49 U.S. at 60)).
57. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868 (2009).
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raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case was
58
pending or imminent.

First, this standard encompasses potentially biasing factors other than the
judge’s direct pecuniary interest in the case before him.59 Second, this standard
does not require a showing of actual bias, but mandates disqualification when
there is an unconstitutionally high “probability of bias.”60 Third, the
assessment of bias is not based upon the jurist’s subjective view of his own
bias61—but on an objective evaluation of the facts by a reasonable other.62
Thus, even under the more stringent constitutional standards, there should be
more instances now when judges must step aside to protect litigants’ rights and
the public’s confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary.
In spite of these changes in the substantive law, it appears that litigants are
seldom successful with the disqualification motions they do file. This is true, at
least in part, because the standards for disqualification are still, in most
instances, applied by the challenged jurist himself who makes that decision
against a backdrop in which the jurist is presumed to be impartial.63 This
presumption of impartiality (along with the judge’s own naïve belief in his
impartiality) tends to limit the instances when jurists actually do recuse.64
However, this may be changing as there also has been a shift in the strength of
this presumption of impartiality that mirrors the shift with the law more
generally from formalism to realism.65 This movement makes sense given that

58. Id. at 884.
59. Id. at 876.
60. Id. at 872.
61. Id. at 869–70.
62. See, e.g., Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Disqualification After Caperton: What’s Due
Process Got to Do With It? 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 368, 375–76 (2011) (under Caperton the
objective “other” who must decide the probability of bias is “a reasonable person skilled in the art
of judging” not the “ordinary lay person.”); Dmitry Bam, Understanding Caperton: Judicial
Disqualification Under the Due Process Clause, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 65, 75 (2010)
(concluding that the ABA disqualification standard is evaluated from the perspective of a
“member of the public,” while the Due Process test is administered by a reasonable judge).
63. Frost, supra note 10, at 571 (2005).
64. Geyh, supra note 40, at 702-711 (explaining how the presumption of impartiality and
psychological factors, including jurists’ ambivalence about disqualification, result in fewer
instances when jurists step aside).
65. That shift is reflected in the split between the majority and the dissent in the Caperton
case. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, explicitly acknowledged that this presumption of
impartiality can be overcome when he stated that the proper inquiry is not whether the challenged
judge subjectively believes he can be impartial, but is an objective standard that requires “a
realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness.” Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 869–70 (2009). In contrast, Chief Justice Robert’s dissenting
opinion emphasized the “presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators”
and predicted that the presumption of impartiality would be threatened by an increase in
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the presumption of impartiality really is a belief in the judge’s ability to act
rationally and without regard to motives, emotions, politics, ideology, or other
personal influences. While this presumption of impartiality increasingly is
being challenged—it is slow to change as it has been an important part of
American disqualification practice66 and more generally judicial philosophy
since the nation’s inception.
In fact, our laws traditionally have assumed that judges—like other legal
actors—behave as rational and autonomous individuals without regard to
emotions, politics, ideology, or other personal influences. This formalist view
of judging presumes that jurists decide cases by rationally, and somewhat
mechanically, applying the law to the facts of a case.67 In spite of what most of
us understand about our own decision-making process, the formalist model of
legal decision making presumes that personal ideology, emotions, motivations,
and beliefs do not play a significant role.68 This traditional view of judging is
the basis for many of the substantive rules and procedures we have adopted as
part of our legal system—including the strong presumption of judicial
impartiality upon which much of our disqualification jurisprudence is based.69
However, this strong presumption of impartiality based upon a legal
formalist view of judicial decision making has been challenged by new
theories about judging. 70 Most prominent among these more recent theories of
judicial decision making is the legal realist view which holds that judges make
choices that reflect their politics.71 In recent years, scholarship also has

disqualification motions that would follow and “bring judges and the judiciary into disrepute.” Id.
at 891, 902 (Roberts, C.J. dissenting).
66. Geyh, supra note 40, at 672-677 (surveying the history of disqualification practice and
identifying four distinct legal regimes over time).
67. BRIAN TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF POLITICS
IN JUDGING 27–43 (2009).
68. See id.
69. See supra notes 10–30 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 19 (2008) (positing that judicial
decision making reflects a combination of nine different theories of judicial behavior—including
attitudinal, strategic, sociological, psychological, economic, organizational, pragmatic,
phenomenological, and legalist). Of course, the idea these other factors influence judicial decision
making is not new. See Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV 809, 846 (1935) (suggesting that “the political, economic, and professional
background and activities” of judges motivate their decision making). However, what is new is
the increasing amount of empirical data to support these differing theories of what impacts
judicial decisions.
71. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE
401–02 (1949) (describing and documenting the legal realist view of judicial decision making);
Charles Gardner Geyh, Introduction: So What Does Law Have to Do with It?, in WHAT’S LAW
GOT TO DO WITH IT? WHAT JUDGES DO, WHY THEY DO IT, AND WHAT’S AT STAKE 1, 1-14
(2011) (collecting essays reflecting how both law and politics affect judicial decision making).
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identified other factors—among them, personal experience and identity,72
social power structures,73 and even financial interests74—that likely influence,
even motivate, the decisions of judges. In addition, legal scholars have
presented new evidence and theories about how psychological motivations and
cognitive processes75 also impact judicial decision making.
In fact, legal scholars are increasingly turning to social science to
understand how and why legal actors make the decisions they do.76 Some legal
scholars have begun to apply these social psychology insights to theories of
how legal decisions are made by both policy makers77 and judges.78 Also,
some recent and notable empirical studies demonstrate that judges are
influenced by the same cognitive decision making processes and, therefore,
make the same systematic errors in judgment that plague the rest of us.79 A few
scholars have even suggested that some of these cognitive illusions—including
the Bias Blind Spot—may affect how judges decide disqualification disputes.80

72. Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study
of Judicial Reasoning 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1385–88, 1472 (1998) (reviewing empirical
research on race and gender biases of judges).
73. LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 26–53 (1997) (describing
social and cultural structures within the courts as influencing judicial decisions).
74. Michael S. Kang & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Partisan Price of Justice: An Empirical
Analysis of Campaign Contributions and Judicial Decisions, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 69, 99–100
(2011) (finding that elected judges are more likely to decide in favor of the business interests that
support their campaign and the likelihood increases as the amount of the campaign contributions
increases).
75. Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 3 (2007).
76. Donald C. Langevoort, Behavorial Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499, 1508 (1998) (surveying the then
existing literature on behavioral theories of decision making and noting it is sparse, but growing).
77. Adam Benforado & Jon Hanson, Naïve Cynicism: Maintaining False Perceptions in
Policy Debates, 57 EMORY L. J. 499, 573 (2008).
78. Bryan D. Lammon, What We Talk About When We Talk About Ideology: Judicial
Politics Scholarship and Naïve Legal Realism 83 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 231, 304–05 (2009).
79. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 780–83 (2001)
(demonstrating that judges are just as likely to be affected by a number of cognitive illusions as
the ordinary public). In addition, there is growing empirical support for the idea that judges are
not alone—that many other highly skilled and qualified professionals such as accountants,
appraisers, doctors, engineers, lawyers, and even psychologists—also are susceptible to cognitive
illusions. Id.
80. See Geyh, supra note 40, at 729, 731 (arguing that reform of recusal procedures is
warranted, but will only succeed if the judiciary and the public can agree on what constitutes an
appearance of impartiality, which agreement is made more difficult by the judiciary’s
ambivalence to disqualification, a strong presumption of impartiality, and a lack of appreciation
for psychological factors that affect a disqualification decision); Jeffrey W. Stempel, In Praise of
Procedurally Centered Judicial Disqualification—and a Stronger Conception of the Appearance
Standard: Better Acknowledging and Adjusting to Cognitive Bias, Spoliation, and Perceptual
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However, none of these recent works has either provided an empirical study of
how these cognitive illusions affect disqualification decisions or explored in
detail any instances when a judge’s disqualification decision may have been
affected by the Bias Blind Spot.
This Article attempts to fill that gap and build on these noteworthy efforts
to apply insights gleaned from social psychology to questions about judicial
decision making—specifically disqualification disputes. This Article does so
by using the three disqualification disputes in Caperton as exemplars to
demonstrate how the Bias Blind Spot and related cognitive illusions affected
those jurists’ judgment and likely impacted public confidence in the judiciary.
The discussion of these decisions focuses on how the substantive standard
combined with the current procedures introduces the risk of systemic error in
disqualification decisions due to the Bias Blind Spot. This Article also explores
ways we can use these new understandings of human cognition to reshape
recusal reform so that we might not only preserve litigants’ fundamental Due
Process rights, but also maintain public confidence in the impartiality of the
judiciary as a whole.
In order to determine whether judges are sufficiently unbiased about their
own biases to consistently make reliable disqualification decisions, we must:
(1) understand the Bias Blind Spot and other cognitive illusions that affect the
judgments that are most critical to assessments of our own biases and our
perceptions of bias in others; and (2) decide whether those cognitive illusions
are likely to affect judicial disqualification decisions given the current
substantive standards and procedural practices used to evaluate judicial
impartiality under the Due Process Clause.
II. THE BIAS BLIND SPOT AND RELATED COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS
“There is no truth. There is only perception.”
Gustave Flaubert
A.

The Bias Blind Spot Defined and Disqualification Deconstructed

The capacity to detect and adjust for his own cognitive biases is critical to
any jurist’s ability to properly resolve a disqualification dispute in which his
impartiality has been challenged. However, we are all—including judges—
subject to the Bias Blind Spot, which is the tendency to fail to discern one’s
own biases while at the same time inferring bias in others.81 This “meta-bias”

Realities, 30 REV. LITIG. 733, 739–40 (2011) (arguing that judges should not require near
unanimity, consensus, or super majority view of what constitutes a “reasonable question” as to a
judge’s impartiality because of the divergence of views between the judiciary and the public
regarding the impact of possible biases on decision making).
81. Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369, 370 (2002).
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creates the mistaken “conviction that one’s own judgments are less susceptible
to bias than the judgments of others.”82 This “perceived asymmetry in
susceptibility to bias” between self and others83 plays an important role in
disqualification disputes because of the substantive standard that applies to
such challenges and the practice of permitting the challenged jurist to assess
his own bias.
Under the applicable disqualification standard, the challenged jurist is
required to assess his own bias not from his subjective point of view—but from
the perspective of a “reasonable person.”84 It does not matter whether that
reasonable other is a layperson or average judge85—it matters only that the
perception of the reasonable other regarding the jurist’s bias will differ from
his own perception of bias in self. Since we tend to consistently and
unconsciously downplay our own biases while exaggerating biases in
others86—this difference in perspective will lead to systemic errors in applying
the current substantive standards for disqualification. While judges often are
tasked with stepping into the shoes of the “reasonable person” and assessing
the conduct and interests of third parties in other areas of the law—only in
disqualification disputes are jurists asked to assess themselves. It is this
difference in the subject of the evaluation that gives rise to the Bias Blind Spot
and causes judges to misapply the law. Thus, we need to understand the causes
of the Bias Blind Spot so we can refocus recusal reform to avoid such errors.
Recent social science studies aptly demonstrate that the Bias Blind Spot
has two primary causes: (1) self-enhancement and self-interest motives; (2)
Naïve Realism, especially the Objectivity Illusion, Confirmation Bias, and
Introspection Illusion.”87 Each of these causes for this asymmetry in perception
of bias between self and others is explained below and then applied to the three
disqualification disputes in the Caperton case in the following Part of this
Article.
B.

Self-Enhancement and Self-Interest Motives and the Bias Blind Spot

It should come as no surprise that the Bias Blind Spot functions, at least in
part, as an ego-protection mechanism. This tendency to see one’s self in a more
positive light in spite of evidence to the contrary is one of the most well-known

82. Joyce Ehrlinger et al., Peering Into the Bias Blind Spot: People’s Assessments of Bias in
Themselves and Others, 31 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 680, 681 (2005) (citations
omitted).
83. Pronin et al., supra note 81, at 369.
84. McKoski, supra note 62, at 374-76; Bam, supra note 62, at 75.
85. Id.
86. Pronin et. al., supra note 81, at 370.
87. Emily Pronin, Perception and Misperception of Bias in Human Judgment, 11 TRENDS IN
COGNITIVE SCI. 37, 37–38 (2007).
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forms of cognitive bias.88 Despite the fact that most people acknowledge the
role of self-enhancement biases in human cognition, they seldom recognize the
impact it has on their own judgments. In fact, even when people “rate
themselves as ‘better than average’ on a wide range of traits and abilities, most
people also claim that their overly positive self-views are objectively true.”89
While people are blind to their own self-enhancement biases, they are quick to
detect such biases in others.90 Thus, people seem to have a Bias Blind Spot in
respect of the self-enhancement motivations that animate our decisions.
We exhibit the same Bias Blind Spot when it comes to our own selfinterests. In fact, studies have shown that people do not readily detect how
their financial, social, political, or other interests inform their own choices.91
However, most of us have no difficulty in recognizing that self-interest may
motivate others’ decisions and actions and we often overestimate the influence
of self-interest in others.92 Thus, we seem to suffer from the illusion of being
superior to others when it comes to how self-interest motivates our decisions
and actions.
While most studies demonstrating these ego-centric biases were not
conducted using judges as subjects—there is no reason to believe that jurists
will be less susceptible to these causes for the Bias Blind Spot. In fact, there is
some empirical evidence that judges are prone to ego-centric biases. In one
such study, federal magistrate judges were asked to estimate their reversal on
appeal rates and the jurists “exhibited a strong ego-centric bias” on this
measurement—with 87.7 percent of judges rating themselves as less likely
than the average judge to be overturned on appeal.93 In this study, the jurists
appeared to suffer from ego-centric biases at rates comparable to those
plaguing laypersons.94 In another study, bankruptcy judges rated themselves as
more fair in respect of their decisions on attorney fee applications than the
lawyers who appear to make such requests of the court.95 Thus, there is no
empirically based reason to suspect judges are less prone than the rest of us to
these ego-centric biases that help create the Bias Blind Spot.

88. Id. at 37.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Guthrie et al., supra note 79, at 814–15 (demonstrating that judges are just as likely to be
affected by ego-centric biases and cognitive illusions as the ordinary public and suggesting such
cognitive limitations could harm litigants).
94. Id. at 818.
95. Theodore Eisenberg, Differing Perceptions of Attorney Fees in Bankruptcy Cases, 72
WASH. U. Q. REV. 979, 985 –86 (1994).
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C. Naïve Realism and its Implications for Judicial Decision Making
Another primary cause of the Bias Blind Spot is Naïve Realism. The core
of Naïve Realism is the conviction that one perceives objects and events in the
world the way “they really are”—in other words objectively96—and when
others do not perceive the world in a similar way, then we infer they do not
“see” how the world “really is” because there is something wrong with them.97
Naïve Realism is important not so much because it focuses on the fact that we
subjectively perceive the world (though we most certainly do)—but on how
and why we systematically fail to appreciate the subjectivity of our own
perception while at the same time holding others accountable for theirs.98 This
asymmetry in perception is the crux of Naïve Realism and it has profound
implications for disqualification jurisprudence because these cognitive
illusions affect how all of us assess our own biases and why we judge others’
biases so differently. As a result, Naïve Realism has much to teach us about
whether a jurist, who most likely will hold the naïve belief that he can be
objective or unbiased about his own biases, really can be “a judge in his own
[disqualification] cause” or if another procedure must be used to ensure
judicial impartiality. Thus, we will carefully review each of the essential tenets
of Naïve Realism and several of the most important cognitive illusions that
underlie our naïve worldviews.
D. The Basic Tenets of Naïve Realism
Naïve Realism is deceptively simple and is made up of only three essential
tenets:
1. I “see” the world objectively—“as it really is.”
2. Other reasonable people should “see” the world the way I do.
3. If other people don’t “see” the world as I do, then they aren’t seeing
99
clearly.

96. Lee Ross & Andrew Ward, Naïve Realism in Everyday Life: Implications for Social
Conflict and Misunderstanding, in VALUES AND KNOWLEDGE 110–11 (Terrance Brown et al.
eds., 1996).
97. Emily Pronin et al., Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of
Bias in Self Versus Others, 111 PSYCHOL. REV. 781, 783 (2004).
98. Id. at 781.
99. This syllogism was articulated by Lee Ross and Andrew Ward in their seminal work on
Naïve Realism as follows:
1. . . . I [perceive] entities and events as they are in objective reality, and that my
social attitudes, beliefs, preferences, priorities, and the like follow from a relatively
dispassionate, unbiased, and essentially “unmediated” apprehension of the information or
evidence at hand.
2. . . . [O]ther rational social perceivers generally will share my [worldview,
including my] reactions, behaviors, and opinions–provided that they have had access to
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While Naïve Realism seems simple—it actually creates something of a
“logical labyrinth.”100 That complexity is due to the fact that Naïve Realism is
based upon two implicit assumptions: (1) All people who truly are openminded and fair will agree with a reasonable opinion; and (2) I hold only
reasonable opinions because if my opinion were not reasonable, I would not
hold it.101 In other words, if other individuals or groups do not share our view
of the world, then we infer there is something wrong with them.
We make these attributions of traits or motives or infer those others have
shortcomings that explain their disagreement with us. We do this rather than
attribute the difference to something faulty with our perception or concede that
the disagreement simply reflects different choices made by two reasonable and
honest people.102 We cannot attribute their disagreement to our faulty
perception because, as naïve realists, we are convinced that our version of the
event or thing in question reflects an objective reality.103 Nor can we attribute
the other’s different response to a reasonable and honest difference in opinions
or values because our naïve realist viewpoint would require us to conform to
those reasonable and honest opinions and values held by the other person.104
Instead, when we perceive a difference that cannot be explained by differing
information (which we often ascertain by trying to convince the other person
of our worldview), then we attribute those differences to their perception of the
information, their intelligence or their impartiality.
1. I “See” the World Objectively—“As It Really Is”
Despite the fact that most of us acknowledge—at least in the abstract—the
subjectivity of our own perceptions, when we look at the world we tend to
assume that what we perceive reflects an “objective reality.” In other words,
we are convinced that we observe all events and objects that are truly
significant and that what we think about those phenomena is reality.105 This
the same information that gave rise to my views, and provided that they too have
processed that information in a reasonably thoughtful and open-minded fashion.
3. . . . [T]he failure of [other] individual[s] or group[s] to share my [worldview] arises
from . . . three possible sources: [they are (a) not informed; (b) irrational; or (c) not
impartial–being biased] by ideology, self-interest, or some other distorting personal
influence[s].
Ross & Ward, supra note 96, at 110–11 (emphasis added).
100. CAROL TAVRIS & ELLIOT ARONSON, MISTAKES WERE MADE (BUT NOT BY ME): WHY
WE JUSTIFY FOOLISH BELIEFS, BAD DECISIONS, AND HURTFUL ACTS 42 (2007).
101. Id.
102. Pronin et al., supra note 97, at 783.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Gustav Ichheiser, Misunderstandings in Human Relations: A Study in False Social
Perception, 55 AM. J. SOC. 1, 39 (1949) (“[W]e tend to resolve our perplexity arising out of the
experience that other people see the world differently than we see it ourselves by declaring that
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conviction that we perceive reality objectively is “inescapable and deep, and it
governs our day-to-day functioning.”106 In fact, this Naïve Realist view of the
world affects what we perceive about ourselves, the world around us, and how
we interact with that world (including others) based upon those perceptions. In
other words, it affects all aspects of our reality:
[N]aïve [R]ealism makes its influence felt not only in convictions about
physical reality but also in convictions about complex social events and
political issues. We cannot fully escape the conviction that we likewise
perceive such events and issues as they “really are,” and that other reasonable
people who have the same information about those events and issues will, or at
107
least should, perceive them similarly.

This “Naïve Realist” view of the world around us is constructed by us based
upon a number of cognitive processes and motivational factors that influence
our thoughts, feelings, and actions. These processes and factors—including the
Illusion of Objectivity, the Confirmation Bias, and the Introspection Illusion—
work together to sustain our Naïve Realist view and enhance the likelihood we
will attribute biased motives to those who disagree with us.
a) Objectivity Illusion
We believe that what we perceive about the world around us relates
directly to an objective reality of those stimuli and events. However, when we
seek to understand what our senses perceive, we “go beyond the information
given”108 to construct a “meaningful ‘whole’ out of a complex and
disorganized array of stimuli, always trying to make sense out of [our]
experience[s].”109 Our perceptions of reality make what we observe
meaningful and are created when our brain fills the gap “between the objective
world of stimuli and the subjective world of experience.”110 Thus, we construct
this perception by interpreting the stimuli we do observe in terms of our “own
needs, own emotions, own personality, [and] own previously formed cognitive

those others, in consequence of some basic intellectual and moral defect, are unable to see things
‘as they really are’ and to react to them ‘in a normal way.’ We thus imply, of course, that things
are in fact as we see them and that our ways [of thinking about objects and events] are the normal
ways.”).
106. Pronin et al., supra note 97, at 783.
107. Id.
108. Dale W. Griffin & Lee Ross, Subjective Construal, Social Inference, and Human
Misunderstanding, 24 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 319, 320 (1991).
109. Id. at 321.
110. Id. at 319. The authors offer a simple example of subjective construal when we are
greeted by silence: “[S]ilence itself has no unique meaning. It could be construed as an indication
of another person’s deliberate attempt at insult; but it alternatively could be construed as an
indication of the other’s great sorrow, or great respect, or great embarrassment.” Id.
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patterns.”111 In other words, we do not perceive an objective reality—but a
mediated version of objective facts that are interpreted through a variety of
filters.
Nevertheless, we are convinced that we perceive an unmediated version of
reality regarding all of our perceptions of the world. We believe we are
objective about our perceptions of the objects in the world—the smells, sights,
and sounds.112 This illusion of our objectivity also extends to interpersonal
relations and other more complex social events.113 These subjective
interpretations of the phenomena we encounter affect the way we perceive
ourselves, others, and our situations and, in turn, impact how we interact with
others in a variety of complex social settings.114 More importantly, the brain
plays this trick—subjectively construing the stimuli we encounter to create
perceptions of ourselves and the world around us—without ever knowing we
are doing it.115 Thus, our brains make us believe that we do “see” the world
objectively—“as it really is.”
b) Confirmation Bias
The subjective interpretations we construct are likely to persevere, even in
the face of contradictory evidence, because we select and process new
information from our subjective and, therefore, biased perspective. This
happens because when we assimilate new evidence, we “go beyond the
information [actually] given”—by “fill[ing] in the details of context and
content, infer[ing] linkages between events, and [adopting] dynamic scripts or
schemes to give events coherence and meaning.”116 Our illusion of objectivity,
coupled with the way we “fill in the gaps” leads us to accept, with little
scrutiny, evidence that is consistent with our existing perspectives and

111. Id. at 321 (quoting DAVID KRECH & RICHARD S. CRUTCHFIELD, THEORY AND
PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 94 (McGraw Hill 1948)).
112. See, e.g., Ross & Ward, supra note 96, at 114 (citing a “Musical Tapping” study that was
designed to test subjective construal of stimuli and finding most participants failed to appreciate
how their own richly embellished internal representations of the songs affected their judgment
about the likely success of the listeners who were presented with only “impoverished,
[ambiguous] stimuli” in the form of taps. The difference in the experience of tappers and listeners
seems obvious—seeing it from our vantage point—but the differences in perception were not so
obvious to the study participants).
113. Id. at 106–07 (describing a study that was a variation on the classic Prisoner’s Dilemma
Game in which the object of the game was to win money and merely changing the name of the
game affected whether the game would be played competitively or cooperatively.).
114. Id. at 104 (asserting that differences in subjective construal “matter” in everyday life and
that social perceivers usually make “insufficient allowance[s]” for the impact of subjective
construal when making inferences or predictions about others).
115. Pronin et al., supra note 97, at 784.
116. Ross & Ward, supra note 96, at 118.
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beliefs.117 On the other hand, we intently scrutinize any evidence that is
inconsistent with our understanding in order to resolve the cognitive
dissonance such new information creates.118 This process of biased
assimilation of new information often “leads to unwarranted perseverance of
beliefs.”119
In addition, these biased perceptions and the biased assimilation of new
evidence also can lead to perceptions of bias in others.120 As a result, in
situations when parties hold opposing views, the two sides “c[a]me away from
the same set of mixed evidence even more polarized, and f[u]rther apart in
their views, than they had been before” 121 and with their version of “objective
reality” more firmly entrenched.
c) Introspection Illusion
Of course, this is not to say that we do not sometimes appreciate the
“reality” we, and others, perceive is subjective rather than objective. In fact,
most of us assume that human behavior—certainly other’s behavior—is
affected by people’s tendency to serve their own self-interests.122 Moreover,
“we do not claim to be immune from wishful thinking, overconfidence,
defensiveness, closed mindedness, and a host of other inferential and
judgmental failings.”123 But, we are likely to admit to such shortcomings only
in connection with past behavior or instances of possible bias—not current
instances.124 In other words, we accept—in the abstract—that at least some of
the time, we are susceptible to making biased judgments or decisions.
However, we consistently fail to recognize how bias affects specific
judgments or decisions we are making currently. If we did appreciate the
influence of bias, then we would change our assessment until it aligned with
our perception of the situation.125 Of course, to make such adjustments in our
perceptions or convictions about a situation we would have to acknowledge
that we were in error—something that is hard for us to do.126 Instead, we cling
to our “naïve reality” and continue to believe—sometimes even in the face of
compelling contrary evidence—that we are objective and unbiased.

117. Pronin et al., supra note 97, at 796 (describing several studies that demonstrate this
biased assimilation and the resulting perseverance of unwarranted beliefs).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Ross & Ward, supra note 96, at 118 (describing earlier studies that demonstrated how
we assimilate new information in ways that reaffirm our beliefs and justifies our actions).
121. Id.
122. Pronin, supra note 87, at 37.
123. Pronin et al., supra note 97, at 783.
124. Id. at 783–84.
125. Id. at 784.
126. Id. at 783.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

258

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII:235

We are able to maintain this false belief in our own objectivity even after
we are asked to determine whether our thoughts or judgments might be
influenced by bias. We can maintain this illusion because of the way we
evaluate our own bias.127 In assessing our own biases, we rely heavily on
introspection.128 In essence, we search our private thoughts, feelings, motives,
and beliefs—rather than evaluate our behavior in order to detect our own
biases.129 This method of assessing our own biases often results in our
detecting no bias in the specific instance and at the same time may confirm our
capacity for bias—at least in the abstract or in past circumstances.130 Thus, our
introspective analysis seldom reveals any bias or other reason we should
change our minds.
However, that does not mean we chose introspection because it is the most
reliable method of assessing bias. In fact, we likely chose to rely upon our own
thoughts, feelings, and beliefs to assess our own biases for a combination of
cognitive and motivational reasons.131 First, our introspections are less likely to
reveal evidence of bias and, thus, we can maintain our positive self-image.132
Second, we likely will not be aware of the fallibility of introspective
“evidence” of bias, but may honestly believe that our introspection is likely to
prove reliable.133 This is true, at least in part, because when we evaluate our
thoughts, feelings, motives, and beliefs we often can recall past instances of
when we may have been biased, thus, confirming the lack of bias presently.134
Third, when we do introspect we often see our own status or experiences as
“particularly enlightening."135
Unfortunately, this confidence in the efficacy of our introspection as a
sound method of assessing bias is misplaced. While we do have conscious
access to the content of our thoughts and feelings, we have no direct conscious
access to “the cognitive and motivational processes (to say nothing of the

127. Emily Pronin & Matthew B. Kugler, Valuing Thoughts, Ignoring Behavior: The
Introspection Illusion as a Source of the Bias Blind Spot, 43 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
565, 566 (2007). Not surprisingly, when evaluating others’ biases we assess their behavior and
give little weight to the others’ thoughts and feelings, even when we have access to them. Id.
128. Id. at 565.
129. Id. at 566.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 567; see also Ehrlinger et al., supra note 82, at 681 (suggesting self-enhancement
motivation and naïve realist cognitive illusions as among the reasons we rely upon introspection
when evaluating our own bias).
132. Pronin & Kugler, supra note 127, at 567.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 576.
135. See Emily Pronin et al., Understanding Misunderstanding: Social Psychological
Perspectives, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 636, 647
(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
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underlying biochemical processes) that influence our perceptions” of reality.136
In other words, we are unable to accurately assess the influence of our own
biases using introspection and are seldom persuaded that we are influenced by
biases—cognitive or motivational. 137 In spite of the fallibility of introspection
as an accurate gauge of our susceptibility to bias, most of us still rely upon our
thoughts and feelings to judge our own potential or actual biases.138
In contrast, we will often rely upon different evidence to discern bias in
others—valuing their actions instead of their thoughts, feelings, beliefs, or
conscious motivations. Also, when we do have access to introspective
evidence for others—we tend to disregard that information as unreliable
predictors of bias in others.139 In addition, we similarly discount the unique
status or experiences of others: “By contrast, we see others’ unique status or
unique experiences as a source of inevitable and understandable biases that
distort their objectivity and lead them to unwise or unreasonable positions on
the relevant issues.” 140
These differences in how we evaluate our own biases (using introspective
evidence) and how we assess the biases of others (with extrospective data)
helps explain our persistent belief in our own objectivity, as well as the
asymmetry in our perceptions of bias in self and others.
2. Other People Should “See” the World the Way I Do.
Given our conviction that our view of the world is both realistic and
objective, we also believe that others will or, at least, should share our
worldview—if they are informed, intelligent, and impartial. In fact, our Naïve
Realist view also leads us to predict that our responses and reactions to the
people, things, and events we encounter will be shared by reasonable others.141
In fact, we often overestimate the commonness and normative “correctness” of
our response and reactions—a phenomena social psychologists have termed
the “false consensus effect.”142 This effect leads us to be overconfident in our
abilities to predict others’ behavior or choices based upon our perceptions of
the situation.143 Thus, when those others don’t agree with us, we struggle to

136. Pronin et al., supra note 81, at 378.
137. Pronin & Kugler, supra note 127, at 567 (describing how we use internal evidence of
bias—our conscious thoughts and feelings—to judge our own impartiality, but rely upon conduct
to evaluate the biases of others).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 566–67.
140. See Pronin et al., supra note 135, at 647.
141. Griffin & Ross, supra note 108, at 334–37.
142. Id. at 337–39; see also Ross & Ward, supra note 96, at 111–13 (describing earlier
studies that demonstrated how participants’ unwarranted confidence in their “objective”
perceptions led them to incorrectly predict others would share their experiences and responses).
143. Griffin & Ross, supra note 108, at 339–43.
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make sense of the cognitive dissonance and often infer they are not informed,
intelligent, or impartial.
3. If Other People Don’t “See” the World as I Do, Then They Aren’t
Seeing Clearly.
When we encounter others who do not agree with our worldview, we make
inferences about the reasons for their choices or behavior—often making
attributions about their character, intellect, or motivations. We are driven to
infer that these others are “not seeing clearly” because we have a strong need
to resolve the mental tension created by these two seemingly contradictory
ideas: (1) I am reasonable so all reasonable people will agree with me; and (2)
you don’t agree with me.144 We must resolve this cognitive dissonance and the
easiest way to do that while protecting our self-image and worldview is to infer
there is something wrong with them.145
Initially, we presume they are sufficiently intelligent and impartial—but
that they are uninformed and simply need more or the right information.146 In
other words, we assume that the other:
has not yet been exposed to the ‘way things [really] are’ or has not yet been
privy to the ‘real’ facts and considerations. Indeed, we may even be so
charitable as to concede that [if] the other party [is made] privy to additional
147
facts and considerations that [they] might actually change their own views.

Unfortunately, we soon discover that—in spite of what we believe to be our
rational, objective, and open-minded attempts at enlightening the other—the
disagreement often is not resolved, the differences seldom are narrowed, and
sometimes the other’s position becomes more entrenched.148
After failing to convince our opponent (and not being persuaded to change
our own minds), we inevitably turn to less charitable explanations to resolve
the cognitive dissonance—we often conclude the other is not intelligent or not
impartial. The attributions of a lack of impartiality can take the form of alleged
self-interest, ideology, or some other influence that distorts an otherwise
objective and reasonable view.149 Since we are convinced we are objective and
reasonable, we assume the “others” have used a less objective or biased
approach to assess the situation:

144. Pronin et al., supra note 135, at 651–53.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 648.
148. Id. (explaining that these supposedly free exchanges of ideas seldom lead us to change
our minds either because we are not presented with new facts or arguments that we find
persuasive given we have already taken a position).
149. Id.
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We assume that these biases distort either their construal of relevant
information or their capacity to proceed rationally and cogently from facts to
conclusions. We feel that while we have proceeded in a logical bottom-up
manner, from the available [objective] facts to reasonable construals and
beliefs, those who hold opposing views [must] have done the opposite (i.e.,
they have proceeded in a top-down fashion, [working] from preexisting
150
motives and beliefs to biased interpretation).

Moreover, when we try to examine the situation more carefully, we see
further proof of the others’ biased approach. We do this because once we
already assume they are biased—we assimilate only those facts that serve as
“evidence” of their perceived bias.151 Our view is not only clouded by our
“biased assimilation”—but our naïve realist view causes us to miss the fact that
our own views and our own interests affect the way we construe the “new
evidence” of the other’s alleged bias.152 As a result, our closer examination of
the situation “serves to sustain rather than allay [our] suspicions” that the other
is not impartial.153 In other words, our Bias Blind Spot causes us not only to
underestimate how our own biases affect our own thoughts, feelings, and
actions—it causes us to overestimate the biases of others and to make other
inferences and attributions to explain why those others do not agree with our
seemingly reasonable convictions.154

150. Pronin et al., supra note 135, at 648.
151. See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text (explaining phenomena of biased
assimilation of new evidence in which we select and assess any new information in such a way
that it confirms the biases we already hold, known as the Confirmation Bias).
152. Pronin et al., supra note 135, at 648.
153. Id.
154. Pronin et al., supra note 81, at 369–70 (describing studies demonstrating that individuals
perceive the existence and operation of cognitive and motivational biases more readily in others
than they perceive in their own feelings, thoughts, and behavior).
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Figure adapted with permission from Pronin, et al., Objectivity is in the Eye of
the Beholder, 111 Psychol. Rev. 781, 795 (AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N 2004).
This asymmetry in our perception of bias in oneself and others—the socalled Bias Blind Spot—has serious implications for disqualification
disputes—in specific cases and to the judicial system in general. The most
obvious consequence is that the jurist who is tasked with deciding whether he
or she is disqualified due to some alleged bias will not be able to see his or her
own biases objectively. This Bias Blind Spot likely will lead to some judges
and justices presiding over cases when he or she is actually biased and,
thereby, depriving a litigant of a “fair trial before a fair tribunal.”155 The other
less obvious consequence is that the jurist’s own assessment of bias likely will
differ in significant ways from how “reasonable” others who are well informed
about the facts will assess the jurist’s actual or apparent bias. This asymmetry
in perception of bias may lead to more than a disagreement over the
disqualification decision—it also can create a maelstrom of misunderstanding
and mistrust.

155. Id.
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Disagreement Seen Through the Lens of Perceived Bias Becomes Conflict

In fact, our tendency to be blind to their own biases while at the same time
recognizing and being quick to point out bias in others often turns a
disagreement into a conflict.156 The perception of disagreement, even when the
parties actually have only minimal disagreement, can induce people to perceive
those “others” not as reasonable people who simply disagree with us—but as
biased adversaries. 157 These perceptions of bias on the part of others, in turn,
cause one to be more likely to take competitive (and, thus, conflict-escalating)
actions against their perceived adversaries.158 The “adversary”—believing the
other to be biased and aggressive—responds in kind.159 Often this escalation
from disagreement to conflict follows a classic downward spiral because “both
sides aggress against each other, while adhering to the [naïve realist] belief that
their own actions are merely a ‘defensive response’ to the ‘offenses’ of the
other side.”160 Thus, a disagreement—fueled by perceptions of bias—escalates
into a conflict following much the same path as a classic conflict escalation
spiral.
THE BIAS PERCEPTION CONFLICT SPIRAL

Figure adapted with permission from Pronin, Perception and Misperception of
Bias in Human Judgment, 11 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 37, 37–38 (Elsevier
2007).
While we might be inclined to believe that the conflict escalates because
each side has differing interests or positions in which they believe
passionately, it appears that perceptions of bias play a very important role in
creating and maintaining the seemingly endless cycle of conflict. In fact, recent
psychological studies tested the hypothesis that perception of bias—rather than
156. Pronin, supra note 87, at 40 (describing the “bias-perception conflict spiral” in which the
perception of bias fuels a cycle of increasing conflict).
157. See id. at 40–41 (citing earlier studies demonstrating that we infer that those who
disagree with us are biased and this perception of bias may lead to increased conflict).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 41.
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differing positions and interests—could cause us to unwittingly fuel the
conflict escalation spiral.161 Thus, when we encounter others who disagree
with us, we not only perceive them to be biased, we assume they are more
likely to be competitive and so we respond to them—or sometimes act
preemptively—in a more aggressive fashion.162 In this way, we take part in
creating and maintaining a bias-perception conflict spiral that makes resolution
of disagreement more difficult.
This is exactly what happened in Caperton—a case that involved the
disqualification of three out of the five state supreme court justices that ended
in a landmark disqualification decision by the United States Supreme Court. In
each instance when one of the state supreme court justices was asked to step
aside based upon an alleged appearance of bias,163 the justice—naïvely
believing he could be impartial—presumed the moving party was biased
against him and then the jurist reacted in ways that not only did not resolve the
disagreement but escalated the conflict. Moreover, in some instances the
litigants themselves responded in kind: making further accusations of bias and
becoming more persistent in their pursuit of the jurist’s recusal. This escalation
of the conflict could have—and arguably did—taint the entire proceedings by
affecting the perceptions those jurists held of the litigants.164 It also changed
the dynamic on the court—as evidenced by some of the opinions issued by the
challenged jurists’ colleagues.165 In order to more fully appreciate how the
Bias Blind Spot can lead to a bias-perception, conflict spiral and infect a
disqualification proceeding, we will take a closer look at the Caperton appeal
as it progressed through the state courts before the case finally arrived at the
steps of the Supreme Court of the United States.

161. Kathleen A. Kennedy & Emily Pronin, When Disagreement Gets Ugly: Perceptions of
Bias and Escalation of Conflict, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 833, 845 (2008)
(describing a series of studies demonstrating that people’s tendency to impute bias to those who
see things differently causes them to take competitive approaches, which lead to actions that
increase conflict and those actions in turn prompt a similar response from the other).
162. Id.
163. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, at 873–76 (2009). Of course, the
tenor of some parts of the motions seeking disqualification and the facts alleged in support of the
recusal requests suggested that the targeted justice might actually be biased rather than merely
appeared to be biased. Id.
164. See id. at 876 (accounting Justice Benjamin’s adamance in declining to recuse himself).
165. Id. at 875.
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III. THE CAPERTON CAPER
“No man shall be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would
certainly bias his judgment and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity.”
The Federalist No. 10 (J. Madison)
The Caperton litigation, commenced in late 1998, took nearly a decade to
wind its way through the West Virginia state court system before it reached the
United States Supreme Court (“SCOTUS”).166 The appeal to SCOTUS brought
by Hugh Caperton and his companies centered on whether Due Process
demanded that one of the justices sitting on the highest court in West Virginia
be disqualified because a person with an interest in the underlying litigation
had expended substantial sums to oppose the justice’s election rival when the
case was pending before the state supreme court.167 Since the challenged
justice’s vote was outcome determinative—he voted to reverse a nearly $50
million jury verdict awarded to the Caperton parties—the majority of justices
on SCOTUS concluded that Due Process required the state supreme court
justice recuse himself and remanded the case to the West Virginia Supreme
Court to be reheard without the disqualified jurist.168 But, the Caperton
dispute—which is really a story of business competitors who also were
personal rivals—started well before the litigation ever even commenced.169
A.

Contest for Control of the Harman Mine Coal

On January 1, 1993, Hugh M. Caperton, through his ownership of several
small, independent companies,170 acquired all the rights to extract the
exceptionally high-quality metallurgical coal in the Harman Mine of Buchanan
County.171 Although Harman Mine had once been a productive operation, in

166. See First Amended Complaint at ¶ 1, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. (W. Va.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 10, 1998) (No. 98-C-192), 1998 WL 35232594, at *1.
167. See Brief for Petitioners at i, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc., 556 U.S.
868 (2009) (No. 08-22).
168. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 890.
169. This Article, unlike the SCOTUS opinions, provides significant detail about the actual
disqualification dispute as it arose and was addressed in the West Virginia Supreme Court
proceedings. The details have been included to allow the reader to evaluate the facts relevant to
the disqualification questions for herself. Also, the hope is that the reader will be able to more
readily understand the asymmetry in perceptions of bias—by comparing her own perception of
bias with how each of the challenged justices perceived their own biases.
170. First Amended Complaint, supra note 166, at ¶ 37. Those companies included Harman
Development Company and its two wholly-owned subsidiaries Harman Mining Corporation and
Sovereign Coal Sales, Inc. (collectively the “Harman Companies”).
171. This type of coal is prized by steel making companies because the coal’s chemical,
mineral, and petrochemical characteristics cause the coal to burn at the particularly high
temperatures needed to produce high quality coke for use in steel manufacturing. See John
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more recent years the operations suffered from a lack of capital infusion and
attention. However, by the end of 1993, Caperton had transformed the
operations at Harman Mine—quadrupling the productive yield of the mine to 1
million tons a year and using 150 union miners, rather than contract workers,
to do it.172 Caperton had no trouble selling the increased amount of coal
produced by the Harman Mine, because the assets acquired when Hugh
Caperton purchased his interest in the Harman Mine included a long term
coals-supply contract with Wellmore, a third party buyer (the “1992 CSA”).173
In fact, in each of the five years that the 1992 CSA was in effect, Wellmore
Coal Corporation (“Wellmore”) purchased the total output of coal from the
Harman Mine at a total cost in the range of $15 million to $20 million per
year.174
Because of this increase in production and a ready market for the coal, in
1996, A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc. (“Massey”)—a large publicly traded
energy company which specialized in production of metallurgical coal175—
became interested in controlling the Harman Mine. If Massey could acquire the
output from the Harman Mine, that move could support a Massey plan to sell
cheaper, less desirable coal to steel producers at higher profit margins.176 In
fact, Massey eventually acquired an interest in Wellmore, Harman’s prime
customer, and caused Wellmore to breach the contracts.177 These actions and
other steps taken by Massey—all of which were directed by and through
Don L. Blankenship, Massey’s CEO and President—allegedly drove Caperton
out of business and into bankruptcy court.178
B.

The Harman Mine Business Interference Litigation

In December 1998, Hugh M. Caperton, and his company Harman
Development Corp., along with the wholly owned subsidiaries Harman Mining
Corp., and Sovereign Coal Sales (collectively, “Caperton”) filed a complaint
against A.T. Massey Coal Company, Inc. and certain affiliates seeking
compensatory and punitive damages arising out of the tortious interference and
fraudulent actions of Massey.179 The gravamen of the complaint by Caperton
was that Massey “caused [Caperton] to lose the ability to continue in the

Gibeaut, Caperton’s Coal, A.B.A. J. MAGAZINE, Feb. 1, 2009, at 1, available at
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/capertons_coal/.
172. Id.
173. First Amended Complaint, supra note 166, at ¶ 36; see also Final Order, Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Co., Inc., (W. Va. Cir. Ct. Aug. 8, 2004) (No. 98-C-192), 2004 WL 4967480, at *7.
174. First Amended Complaint, supra note 166, at ¶ 41.
175. Id. at ¶¶ 70–72, 83; see also Final Order, supra note 173, at *6.
176. First Amended Complaint, supra note 166, at ¶¶ 77–84.
177. Id. at ¶¶ 96–100.
178. Id. at ¶¶ 175–84.
179. Id. at ¶ 1.
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business of mining and selling coal [from the Harman Mines] and . . . caused
the corporate Plaintiffs to become insolvent.”180
In mid-August 2002, after more than three years of pre-trial activity and
nearly seven weeks of trial, a West Virginia jury returned a verdict against
Massey for tortious interference with contractual relations, fraudulent
misrepresentation, and fraudulent concealment in connection with Caperton’s
failed operations at the Harman Mines.181 The jury awarded Caperton nearly
$50 million in compensatory and punitive damages on its contractual and tortbased claims.182
Shortly thereafter, on August 30, 2002, Massey filed its first in a series of
post-trial motions seeking relief from the jury verdict, specifically asking the
court to set aside or reduce the judgment in Massey’s favor as a matter of law,
grant a new trial, or in the alternative reduce the punitive portion of the jury
award.183 During the next two years, Massey filed supplemental briefs and
additional motions seeking relief from the $50 million jury award.184 In August
2004, the state trial court denied Massey's post-trial motions challenging the
verdict and seeking a reduction in the damages award, finding that Massey
“intentionally acted in utter disregard of [Caperton's] rights and ultimately
destroyed [Caperton's] businesses because, after conducting cost-benefit
analyses, [Massey] concluded it was in its financial interest to do so.”185
Thereafter, Massey filed further post-trial motions seeking entry of judgment
in Massey’s favor as a matter of law, granting a new trial, or in the alternative
reducing the $50 million jury award.186 In mid-March 2005, the trial court
again denied all pending Massey motions for entry judgment as a matter of law
and declined to grant Massey’s request for a new trial—criticizing the posttrial tactics employed by Massey.187
C. The Race for a Seat on West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
While Massey’s post-trial motions for relief were pending, West Virginia
held its 2004 judicial elections, in which one of the five seats on the state’s

180. Id.
181. Amended Circuit Court Order on Jury Award of Punitive Damages, reprinted in
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 22a (2009) (No. 08-22) [hereinafter
Amended Order on Punitive Damages].
182. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 679 S.E.2d 223, 233 (W. Va. 2008).
183. See Amended Order on Punitive Damages, supra note 181, at 27a.
184. Circuit Court of Boone County, W. Va. Final Order, reprinted in Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 43a–103a (2009) (No. 08-22) [hereinafter Boone County
Final Order].
185. Amended Order on Punitive Damages, supra note 181, at 32a.
186. Boone County Final Order, supra note 184, at 43a–103a.
187. Id.
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highest court188 was contested. Aware that the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia (“WVSC”) would consider the appeal in the Caperton case,189
Don Blankenship decided to support a little-known attorney, Brent D.
Benjamin, who ran as Justice McGraw’s opponent. Blankenship contributed
the $1,000 statutory maximum to Benjamin's election campaign committee.190
However, Blankenship did more than that—he did much more.
In fact, Blankenship contributed or spent a total of nearly $3.5 million to
help Benjamin unseat Justice McGraw.191 Blankenship donated almost $2.5
million to And For The Sake Of The Kids (“ASK”), a political organization
formed under 26 U.S.C. § 527, which opposed McGraw and supported
Benjamin.192 Blankenship's donations to ASK accounted for more than twothirds of the total funds the organization raised.193 In addition, Blankenship
spent just over $500,000 more on direct mailings, letters soliciting donations,
as well as television and newspaper advertisements “to support . . . Brent
Benjamin.”194 The more than $3 million in contributions and independent
expenditures Blankenship made aggregated more than the total amount spent
by all other Benjamin supporters and three times the amount spent by
Benjamin's own campaign committee.195 In addition, there was some evidence
that the amount spent by Blankenship was $1 million more than the total

188. See Natalie E. Tennant, W. VA. SEC’Y OF STATE, 2004 Election Returns
http://www.sos.wv.gov/elections/history/electionreturns/Documents/2004/2004%20Supreme%20
Court%20Gen.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2013); see also Meryl Chertoff & Dustin F. Robinson,
Check One and the Accountability is Done: The Harmful Impact of Straight-Ticket Voting on
Judicial Elections, 75 ALB. L. REV. 1773, 1788–89 (2012).
189. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals (“WVSC”) is the state’s highest court and
the court of last resort in West Virginia. The WVSC hears all appeals in the state. West Virginia
is one of only eleven states with a single appellate court. West Virginia Judiciary,
http://www.courtswv.gov/supreme-court/index.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2013).
190. See Benjamin for Supreme Court Committee, State of West Virginia Campaign
Financial Statement (Long Form) in Relation to 2004 Election Year, reprinted in Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 288a (2009) (No. 08-22) [hereinafter Campaign
Financial Statement].
191. Id.
192. Concurring Opinion of Justice Benjamin, reprinted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 672a–73a (2009) (No. 08-22).
193. And For The Sake Of The Kids, Post General Election Report of Contributions and
Expenditures, reprinted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 150a (2009)
(No. 08-22).
194. Don L. Blankenship, State of West Virginia Campaign Financial Statement in Relation
to 2004 Election Year (Sept. 14, 2004) reprinted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S.
868 app. at 184a, 186a, (2009) (No. 08-22); Don L. Blankenship, State of West Virginia
Campaign Financial Statement in Relation to 2004 Election Year (Dec. 6, 2004) reprinted in
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 200a (2009) (No. 08-22) (quoting
Blankenship’s state campaign financial disclosure filings).
195. Campaign Financial Statement, supra note 190, at 288a.
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amount spent by the campaign committees of both McGraw and Benjamin
combined.196
When the election results were tallied, Brent Benjamin was the winner:
Benjamin received 382,036 votes (53.3 percent), defeating McGraw, who
received 334,301 votes (46.7 percent) cast in the state wide election, by a
handy margin.197
D. The Appeal and the First Motion to Disqualify Justice Benjamin
In October 2005, after Massey publicly announced its decision to appeal,
but before Massey’s appeal actually was docketed in the WVSC, Caperton
moved to disqualify Justice Benjamin because of Blankenship’s election
support.198 Caperton primarily based its claim for relief on West Virginia Code
of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(E)(1), which provides a “judge shall disqualify
himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned.”199 Caperton argued that Blankenship's financial
support of and involvement in the judicial election that resulted in Brent
Benjamin becoming a Justice on the WVSC created reasonable questions about
Justice Benjamin’s impartiality.200 Although Caperton did not assert that
Justice Benjamin was actually biased in favor of Massey—that wasn’t required
by state law, which encompassed an appearance of bias standard.201
In support of the motion, Caperton submitted a number of exhibits. The
evidence included an internal Massey memo authored by Blankenship decrying
the jury verdict as “frightening” and vowing to appeal.202 The other evidence
proffered by Caperton included various financial disclosure forms filed by
Benjamin’s campaign committee, as well as ASK, the 527 organization that
supported Benjamin’s election and targeted his opponent, incumbent Justice

196. Brief for Petitioners at 28, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., (W. Va. Cir. Ct. March
15, 2005) (No. 98-C-192), 2005 WL 5679073.
197. Concurring Opinion of Justice Benjamin, supra note 192, at 677a.
198. Motion of Respondent Corporations for Disqualification of Justice Benjamin, reprinted
in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 104a–320a (2009) (No. 08-22)
[hereinafter Motion for Disqualification of Justice Benjamin]. Hugh Caperton also filed a separate
motion seeking Justice Benajmin’s disqualification based on essentially the same grounds. See
generally Hugh M. Caperton’s Motion for Disqualification Directed to Justice Brent D.
Benjamin, reprinted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 321a–35a (2009)
(08-22) [hereinafter 2d Caperton Benjamin Disqualification Motion]. Both of the disqualification
motions reference the Due Process Clause, as well as the general standards of fairness that
underlie disqualification jurisprudence. However, the recusal requests are primarily focused on
Canon 3(E)(1) of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct.
199. W. VA. CODE JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(E)(1) (2013).
200. 2d Caperton Benjamin Disqualification Motion, supra note 198, at 323a–32a.
201. See id.
202. Memorandum from Don Blankenship to Massey Members, reprinted in Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 115a (2009) (No. 08-22).
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McGraw.203 In addition, Caperton provided the court with prints of various
television and newspaper advertisements paid for by ASK and Benjamin’s
campaign committee204 and the transcript of a public radio station broadcast on
the influence of money in judicial elections and the need to recuse to preserve
impartiality or the appearance of impartiality.205 Also, Caperton’s motion cited
a number of reporters, editorialists, and commentators who called for Justice
Benjamin to step aside.206 In all, Caperton submitted over 200 pages of
documents in support of its request for recusal.207
Caperton claimed the submissions supported its argument that Justice
Benjamin was disqualified because the evidence:
connect[ed] the 2002 jury verdict in the above litigation with petitioner
Massey’s involvement in the 2004 judiciary election in which Justice
Benjamin won his seat on the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals [and]
creat[ed] reasonable and substantial, if not overwhelming, doubts whether
Justice Benjamin—or any judge in his shoes—could be impartial and unbiased
208
in adjudicating Massey’s appeal in this matter.

Notably, Caperton did not argue that Justice Benjamin was in fact biased.
Rather, Caperton alleged only that reasonable and substantial doubts would be
created about the ability of “any judge in his shoes” to remain impartial and
unbiased given the timing, amount, and relative size of the campaign
contributions and other financial support offered by Massey CEO and
Chairman, Don Blankenship. 209
Justice Benjamin never disputed the facts regarding the campaign
contributions, independent expenditures, and other financial support that

203. And For The Sake Of The Kids, Third Quarterly Report of Contributions and
Expenditures (Oct. 15 2004) reprinted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at
117a–141a (2009) (No. 08-22); And For The Sake Of The Kids, Post General Election Report of
Contributions and Expenditures (Dec. 2, 2004) reprinted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
556 U.S. 868 app. at 142a–74a (2009) (08-22); And For The Sake Of The Kids, Year-End Report
of Contributions and Expenditures (Jan. 31, 2005) reprinted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 175a–80a (2009) (08-22).
204. Prints from Televised Advertisements Produced for And For The Sake Of The Kids And
for the Benjamin For Supreme Court Committee, reprinted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
556 U.S. 868 app. at 301a–313a (2009) (No. 08-22); News Ads Criticize McGraw, West Virginia
Justice Watch (Sept. 7, 2004) reprinted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app.
at 314a–16a (2009) (08-22).
205. Transcript from West Virginia Public Radio Broadcast re: Contributions to Supreme
Court Race, reprinted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 317–20a (2009)
(No. 08-22).
206. News Ads Criticize McGraw, supra note 204, at 314a–16a.
207. See generally Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 177a–320a
(2009) (No. 08-22).
208. Motion for Disqualification of Justice Benjamin, supra note 198, at 108a.
209. Id.
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Blankenship—either directly or indirectly—provided to influence the judicial
election.210 Thus, the facts in support of the relief stood uncontested when
Justice Benjamin made his disqualification decision in April 2006.211 At that
time, Justice Benjamin denied Caperton’s disqualification motions in an order
that contained a mere five paragraphs and was slightly more than two pages
long.212 In his short opinion, Justice Benjamin stated that he “carefully
considered the bases and accompanying exhibits proffered by the movants.”213
Justice Benjamin admitted he did not review214 any of the exhibits regarding
the campaign contributions disclosure documents for his election campaign
committee.215 Nevertheless, Justice Benjamin denied the motions, finding them
without adequate support:
no objective information is advanced [by movants] to show that this Justice has
a bias for or against any litigant, that this Justice has prejudged the matters
which comprise this litigation, or that this Justice will be anything but fair and
impartial. What is amply present in the materials filed is surmise, conjecture,
216
and political rhetoric.

E.

Justice Benjamin Votes to Reverse $50 Million Jury Verdict Entered
Against Massey

In December 2006, Massey filed its petition for appeal to challenge the
$50 million jury verdict entered in favor of Caperton and the WVSC granted
Massey’s request for review.217 In November 2007, the WVSC reversed the
$50 million verdict against Massey.218 The majority opinion, authored by then
210. See generally And For The Sake Of The Kids, Third Quarterly Report of Contributions
and Expenditures, reprinted in Capteron v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 117a–
130a (2009) (No. 08-22); Order of Justice Benjamin Regarding Recusal, reprinted in Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 336a–38a (2009) (No. 08-22). The contributions are
listed on these pages and not disputed by Justice Benjamin.
211. See generally Order of Justice Benjamin Regarding Recusal, supra note 210, at 336a–
38a.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 336a.
214. Id. at 337a n.2. Interestingly, Justice Benjamin did not represent that he had no
knowledge of what the publicly filed documents disclosed: Blankenship’s contributions to
Benjamin’s campaign committee fund and significant support of an organization that was
targeting Benjamin’s opponent in the election.
215. Apparently, Justice Benjamin believed that not reviewing those campaign financial
records would protect him from recusal challenges in future cases in which other donors might be
involved. However, there is nothing in the relevant judicial ethics codes to suggest that was
correct. See W. VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 5(c)(2) (2013).
216. Order of Justice Benjamin Regarding Recusal, supra note 210, at 336a–37a.
217. Relevant Docket Entries from West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, reprinted in
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 4a–5a (2009) (No. 08-22).
218. See generally Opinion of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, reprinted in
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 344a–411a (2009) (No. 08-22).
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Chief Justice Davis and joined by Justices Benjamin and Maynard, found that
“Massey's conduct warranted the type of judgment rendered in this case.”219 In
spite of this characterization of Massey’s conduct, the WVSC nevertheless
reversed the jury verdict.220 Justice Starcher dissented, and decried the
majority's opinion as “morally and legally wrong.”221 Justice Albright also
dissented, accusing the majority of “misapplying the law and introducing
sweeping ‘new law’ into our jurisprudence that may well come back to haunt
us.”222 Justice Benjamin sided with two other justices and voted to reverse the
jury award against Massey.223 Following entry of the order reversing the
judgment in its favor, Caperton renewed his motion to disqualify Justice
Benjamin and also sought to disqualify Chief Justice Maynard.224
F.

Justice Benjamin Justifies His Participation in the Appeal

Justice Benjamin cast one of the three votes in favor of reversing the jury
verdict that Caperton had won, which means that his denial of the
disqualification motion determined the outcome of the appeal. Thus, the
reasons for Justice Benjamin’s refusal to step aside merit further review.
Unfortunately, we are unable to fully assess Benjamin’s legal decision in
any meaningful way because he—like most other jurists225—provided little
analysis of how the legal standards for disqualification applied to the facts
presented in the disqualification motions. Instead, most of the short order is
filled with conclusory statements rather than actual legal analysis.226 In fact,
Justice Benjamin’s order—unlike the Caperton motions to disqualify him—
contains absolutely no citations to the West Virginia Judicial Code, any cases
applying that legal standard, or any other relevant legal authorities.227

219. Id. at 357a.
220. Id. at 345a. The court cited two independent legal grounds for the reversal. First, that a
forum-selection clause contained in a contract to which Massey was not a party barred the suit in
West Virginia. The second ground for the reversal was that res judicata barred the suit due to an
out-of-state judgment to which Massey was not a party. Id.
221. Id. at 420a–22a (Albright, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 430a–31a (Albright, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 412a–19a.
224. Motion of Harman Development Corp., and Sovereign Coal Sales, Inc. for
Disqualification of Chief Justice Maynard and Renewal of Motion for Disqualification of Justice
Benjamin, reprinted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 432a (2009) (No.
08-22) [hereinafter Renewed Motion to Disqualify Justice Benjamin]. .
225. See Frost, supra note 10, at 569 (calling for reform of the procedures used to decide
disqualification disputes to include written opinions to give legitimacy to disqualification
decisions).
226. See generally Order of Justice Benjamin Regarding Recusal, supra note 210, at 336a–
38a.
227. Id. at 337a. Justice Benjamin did cite one case: United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31
(D.C. Cir. 1976). But, this Watergate-era case, which holds that a judge may not disregard his
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Moreover, the order provides no substantive response to the factual allegations
that were provided in support of the recusal request.228 In spite of the limited
analysis contained in the order, the writing does provide some insight into why
Justice Benjamin may have declined to step aside.
1. Justice Benjamin Applies the Wrong Legal Standard
First, the order demonstrates that Justice Benjamin misunderstood the legal
standards that govern judicial disqualification in West Virginia. Based upon his
own order, it appears that Justice Benjamin applied a test of actual bias:
Each consideration of disqualification must be determined by the specific facts
present in the case, and not by generalized subjective preconceptions,
conclusions or speculations. A consideration thus necessarily must focus on
objective bases specific to a given case and a given jurist, i.e., whether there is
a proper basis based on objective factors to believe that a given jurist will be
229
unable to render a fair and impartial decision in a given case.

However, West Virginia disqualification practice, like in most states, is
governed by an objective test that does not require a showing of actual bias.
Instead, the applicable legal standard requires only that the movant
demonstrate that the facts and circumstances give rise to an appearance of
bias.230 Thus, Justice Benjamin’s analysis focused on an incorrect legal
standard—one of actual bias instead of a reasonable appearance of bias.
Second, the rest of the opinion shows that Justice Benjamin viewed the
question of whether he might be biased from the wrong perspective.
Specifically, it appears that Justice Benjamin determined whether he—not a
reasonable and well-informed third party—would have doubts about his
impartiality.231 This is incorrect—but completely consistent with news stories
reported shortly after the election, which contain statements from Justice
Benjamin suggesting he would use this approach to disqualification in matters
involving Massey and its affiliates.232 However, his order went even further—

duty to sit and step aside because he is allegedly biased against a party based upon what
transpires in the litigation, is inapposite. In fact, Justice Benjamin’s reliance on this authority is
seriously misplaced. See Stempel, supra note 18, at 39–40.
228. See generally Order of Justice Benjamin Regarding Recusal, supra note 210, at 336a–
38a.
229. Id. at 336a (emphasis added).
230. Id. at 335a (characterizing the West Virginia standard for disqualification as when “a
reasonable person, knowing all of the relevant facts, would harbor doubts about Justice
Benjamin’s ability to be impartial”).
231. Id. at 336a–37a.
232. See Brad McElhinny, Benjamin knocks Warren McGraw off Supreme Court; Loser Lets
His Son Speak for Him After Bitter, Brutal Campaign, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL (West
Virginia), Nov. 3, 2004, at P1A available at http://charleston-daily-mail.vlex.com/vid/benjaminknocks-mcgraw-loser-bitter-brutal-64446339 (“Benjamin would not promise to remove himself
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it seemed to require that the disqualification motions contain evidence that the
jurist himself believed proved he could not be impartial: “[N]o objective
information is advanced to show that this Justice has a bias for or against any
litigant, that this Justice has prejudged the matters which comprise this
litigation, or that this Justice will be anything but fair and impartial in his
consideration of matters related to this case.”233 Given this high standard—one
that essentially requires the movant to convince the challenged judge himself
that he could not be impartial under any set of circumstances—it is not
surprising that Justice Benjamin declined to step aside.
Third, Justice Benjamin apparently gave little weight to the materials
submitted by Caperton in support of its motions. That evidence consisted of
objective facts regarding an appearance of bias, including: (1) the amount of
financial support—whether direct contributions or indirect expenditures
provided by Blankenship—totaling $3 million; (2) Blankenship was the CEO
and Chairman of Massey at the time; (3) Massey intended to appeal the jury
verdict rendered in Caperton’s favor at the time the financial support was
provided by Blankenship; and (4) the jury verdict against Massey was $50
million plus a significant amount of interest.234 Also, Caperton offered
information about the opinions of numerous reasonable others235—reporters,
editorialists, and commentators—who believed that Justice Benjamin should
step aside or had otherwise questioned the Benjamin-Blankenship
connection.236 In spite of this information, Justice Benjamin stated that the
disqualification motions mostly consisted of “surmise, conjecture, and political
rhetoric.”237 Thus, it seems that Justice Benjamin substituted his own judgment
for that of the “well-informed reasonable person.”
However, none of this explains why Justice Benjamin applied the wrong
legal standard or what caused him to discredit the seemingly credible evidence
that reasonable others “harbored doubts” about his impartiality. Since Justice
from any case involving Massey Energy, but he said he would disqualify himself from any case
in which he believed he could not be fair. He said he thought he could be fair, though. ‘I don’t
know why I wouldn’t be,’ he said”) (emphasis added); see also Toby Coleman, Benjamin May
Face Bias Questions; Court Winner Says He Is ‘Not Bought by Anybody,’ THE CHARLESTON
GAZETTE (West Virginia), Nov. 4, 2004, at P1C available at http://charleston-gazette.vlex.com/
vid/benjamin-bias-winner-bought-anybody-64155894 (“Benjamin does not know if he will
participate in any of those cases [involving Massey, with specific reference made to this case]. ‘I
will have to see each case on a case-by-case basis,’ he said after promising to recuse himself
‘from any case I don’t believe I will be fair in’”) (emphasis added).
233. Order of Justice Benjamin Regarding Recusal, supra note 210, at 336a–37a.
234. See 2d Caperton Benjamin Disqualification Motion, supra note 198, at 327a–33a.
235. Id. at 330a–31a, 333a–34a. Presumably these others—reporters, editorialists,
commentators—were well-informed after reading the disqualification motions and sufficiently
intelligent to comprehend the materials.
236. Id.
237. Order of Justice Benjamin Regarding Recusal, supra note 210, at 337a.
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Benjamin’s refusal to recuse was out of step with the convictions about his
impartiality held by so many well-informed and reasonable others,238 we are
left to infer that Justice Benjamin was not informed, not intelligent, or not
impartial.239 In fact, this is exactly what at least one well-known legal scholar
who regularly writes about judicial ethics and decision making has suggested
about the jurist.240 However, there is another plausible, even more probable,
explanation: Justice Benjamin—like most of us—has a Bias Blind Spot.
2. Justice Benjamin Naïvely Believes He Can Objectively Judge His
Own Biases
In fact, most of the passages from Justice Benjamin’s order reflect a naïve
realist view of his own impartiality. This is understandable given that, although
we want to be accurate, we also have a strong desire to see ourselves in a
favorable light. This tendency, especially when coupled with the strong
presumption of impartiality that supports each judge’s self-identity as a jurist,
certainly could—and apparently did—influence the disqualification decision.
With the starting point of presumed impartiality, Justice Benjamin only needed
to consider any specific evidence of his alleged bias in this particular case.
However, there are two additional obstacles to accurately assessing one’s own
bias: the Introspection Illusion and the Confirmation Bias. Both of these
cognitive illusions appeared to have affected Justice Benjamin’s assessment of
his own biases.
Based upon the lack of objective analysis of the facts presented, it appears
that Justice Benjamin succumbed to the Introspection Illusion that plagues us
all. There were two types of evidence available for Justice Benjamin to assess
his partiality: introspective and extrospective. The first category includes the
judge’s own thoughts, feelings, and beliefs about his impartiality. The second
category includes the judge’s behavior or conduct—viewed objectively and
238. 2d Caperton Benjamin Disqualification Motion, supra note 198, at 330a–34a. Those
well-informed reasonable others included not just the Caperton parties and the members of the
press and the academy who were following the case at that time—but later included a host of
others: (1) the literally hundreds of reporters or commentators who called for him to step aside;
(2) the signatories of the amicus curiae briefs filed in support of Caperton when the case was
pending before SCOTUS; and (3) the majority of SCOTUS Justices. Of course, there were
reporters, commentators, judges, lawyers, academics, citizens of West Virginia, and members of
the general public who did not see the need for Justice Benjamin to recuse himself. In addition,
the dissenting SCOTUS Justices did not seem to be overly concerned with Justice Benjamin’s
decision that he need not step aside.
239. In writing this sentence, I am fully aware that making those kinds of attributions is
exactly how a Naïve Realist deals with the cognitive dissonance created by Justice Benjamin’s
disagreement with the idea that he should have stepped aside given the facts presented and the
legal standard that should have been applied.
240. See Stempel, supra note 18, at 55–57 (suggesting that Benjamin’s decision to not
disqualify himself reflects he was: (1) not intelligent; (2) immature; or (3) not impartial).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

276

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII:235

without regard to his subjective state of mind. Justice Benjamin was not
persuaded by and in fact seemed to barely consider the extrospective
evidence241 that might reasonably call into question his impartiality. Instead,
Justice Benjamin rejected the information that was offered as evidence and
found instead that “no objective information [wa]s advanced to show”242 any
bias or partiality on his part. Thus, it appears that Justice Benjamin evaluated
his impartiality in the same way the rest of us do: he relied heavily, if not
exclusively, on introspection.
Given his Bias Blind Spot, when Justice Benjamin introspected about his
possible biases, he found no evidence that he might not be impartial in this
particular instance. If his introspection had revealed that “tug of wishful
thinking” or “taint of self-interest,”243 then, presumably, Justice Benjamin
would have stepped aside. Since our motivational and cognitive biases largely
operate without us ever being consciously aware of their impact, we will
seldom find evidence of our own biases when we consciously examine our
own thoughts, feelings, and beliefs. In addition, Justice Benjamin valued his
own internal assessment more than the assessments of others—even though the
applicable law required him to apply an objective third person standard. Thus,
Justice Benjamin did what most of us do when evaluating our own biases—he
succumbed to the Introspection Illusion, which confirmed his belief that he
was not biased in this specific instance.
Justice Benjamin fell for another trick the mind plays to help us maintain
our conviction that our own perception of self is objective and accurate: the
Confirmation Bias. Justice Benjamin selected and assimilated the new
evidence of his possible or probable bias in a biased manner—thereby
reinforcing his belief in his own impartiality. When we start with the
presumption of impartiality (or after we determine we are not biased), we give
credence only to the new evidence that supports our conviction of
impartiality.244 One way we do this is to discredit the new contradictory
evidence—labeling it as untrustworthy and doing so without any objective
analysis of the value of the evidence. That is exactly what Justice Benjamin did
when he declared the motions were filled with “surmise, conjecture, and
political rhetoric.”245 The evidence presented included documentation of
Blankenship’s direct contributions and support, as well as his independent
expenditures and hundreds of news articles in which third parties questioned

241. See Geyh, supra note 40, at 709. This is the perspective a reasonable and objective third
party likely would have about the situation based upon the connection between the jurist and an
interested party.
242. Order of Justice Benjamin Regarding Recusal, supra note 210, at 336a–37a.
243. See Ehrlinger et al., supra note 82, at 681.
244. See supra notes 116–21 and accompanying text (discussing Confirmation Bias).
245. Order of Justice Benjamin Regarding Recusal, supra note 210, at 337a.
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his impartiality given the financial support of Blankenship.246 Thus, Justice
Benjamin’s summary dismissal of the data seems consistent with how such
evidence is evaluated when viewed from a biased perspective.
At the same time he became more convinced of his own impartiality,
Justice Benjamin inferred that there was something wrong with those who
disagreed with him. Specifically, his order suggests that the Caperton parties
(and their counsel) are not informed of the real or “objective” relevant facts,
that they do not understand the legal standards or purposes of recusal motions,
or that they are biased.247 In fact, Justice Benjamin suggests that the
disqualification motions are ill-intended: “The proper purpose of such a motion
is to preserve, not inhibit, the administration of justice.”248 Justice Benjamin
goes on to assert that it is the Caperton parties who are unfairly biased against
him:
The measure of whether a Justice should or should not recuse himself
necessarily is not the bias or prejudice which a litigant may have regarding the
Justice. Our judicial system requires more. A litigant’s subjective belief that a
Justice may be more or less favorable to his position is therefore an insufficient
249
basis for disqualification.

As already noted, Justice Benjamin also characterized the motions as being
filled with “surmise, conjecture, and political rhetoric.”250 In this way, Justice
Benjamin gave short shrift to the motions, and the hundreds of critics
referenced in the motions who called for him to step aside. Thus, Justice
Benjamin sought to explain why those “others” did not see the question of his
bias the way he perceived his own impartiality by suggesting they—not he—
were wrong.
In other words, Justice Benjamin succumbed to the naïve realist view of
himself and the world around him. Starting with a strong presumption that he
was impartial, Justice Benjamin introspected and found little or no evidence
that he could not be fair. Thus, he became more convinced that his perception
of his lack of biases was objectively correct—an unmediated and accurate
depiction of the “actual” facts. When the movants and third party others did
not agree with him, Justice Benjamin sought to resolve the cognitive
dissonance by dismissing the new evidence that did not comport with his naïve
realist view of his own objectivity. In order to resolve the cognitive dissonance
created with those others that did not agree with his “objective” worldview,
Justice Benjamin inferred that those others were not informed, not intelligent,

246. See generally Financial Disclosure Exhibits reprinted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 117a–313a (2009) (No. 08-22).
247. Order of Justice Benjamin Regarding Recusal, supra note 210, at 336a–37a.
248. Id. at 337a.
249. Id. at 337a–38a.
250. Id. at 336a–37a.
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or not impartial.251 Thus, Justice Benjamin did what nearly every judge and
every one of us would do if put in the same position: he overlooked what
others saw—his own possible or probable bias—because of his own Bias Blind
Spot.
G. Caperton and the Critics Respond As Naïve Realists
Not surprisingly, Justice Benjamin’s decision to not step aside was met
with the exact kind of response from interested others that Naïve Realism
predicts: skepticism about the impartiality (and implicitly the integrity) of the
challenged jurist. It is clear the Caperton parties thought Justice Benjamin had
not been objective about his own impartiality. In fact, the Caperton parties said
as much in their renewed motion for disqualification when they questioned
Justice Benjamin’s stated reasons for not stepping aside: “[a]pplication of the
objective test mandated by this Court—rather than Justice Benjamin’s
subjective belief about his impartiality—requires that Justice Benjamin
withdraw his vote in this matter and recuse himself from any further
participation in the case.”252 This suggests that the Caperton parties had little
faith in Justice Benjamin—either because he was not informed, not intelligent,
or not impartial.
Also, the Caperton motion did point out the proper legal standard had not
been applied by Justice Benjamin:
[The test applied by Justice Benjamin] is simply not the test against which [the
disqualification motion] should have been decided. Rather, the test is whether
a reasonable and objective person knowing all the facts would harbor doubts
concerning the judge’s impartiality . . . . Application of the objective test
mandated by this Court—rather than Justice Benjamin’s subjective belief
about his impartiality—requires that Justice Benjamin withdraw his vote in this
253
matter and recuse himself from any further participation in the case.

This statement clearly infers a lack of both information and intelligence on the
part of the jurist. The renewed disqualification motion also suggested that
Justice Benjamin had not been impartial about his partiality by noting that
there were ample “objective” facts regarding Justice Benjamin’s connection
with Blankenship that would cause a reasonable third party to call into
question the justice’s impartiality.254

251. Id. at 338a. This is not to say that Justice Benjamin held actual biases for or against a
party or interested person in the case and that he was intentionally blind to those biases. Rather,
the point is that Justice Benjamin was blind to how he could be affected by motivational and
cognitive biases and be unaware of the impact of those biases.
252. Renewed Motion to Disqualify Justice Benjamin, supra note 224, at 438a.
253. Id.
254. See id. at 437a–38a.
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Moreover, the renewed request that Justice Benjamin step aside was paired
with a request that Chief Justice Elliot “Spike” Maynard be disqualified.255 The
implication is clear: if another justice on the same court with close ties to
Blankenship should step aside, so should Justice Benjamin. Of course, since
the Caperton parties (and others) harbored doubts about Justice Benjamin’s
impartiality in deciding the disqualification motion, they likely had similar
doubts as to whether he actually judged the merits of the appeal impartially. In
addition, those reporters, editorialists, and commentators following the
situation responded with equally cynical views of Justice Benjamin’s decision
to not step aside.256 These responses are completely predictable because when
“others” don’t agree with our view of any given situation, we tend to infer not
that we are not informed, not intelligent, or not impartial—but that something
must be wrong with them.
It is tempting to think that this all happened simply because Justice
Benjamin was not actually impartial. Justice Benjamin may have been
motivated by a desire to stay on the case that at least indirectly involved a
person who generously supported his election to high judicial office.257 But,
when we look at the disqualification disputes involving two other Justices on
the West Virginia Supreme Court who also were asked to step aside in this
case—Chief Justice Maynard and Justice Starcher—we will see some
strikingly similar behavior. In fact, review of those circumstances reveals
further examples of how the Bias Blind Spot distorts a jurist’s ability to
properly decide disqualification disputes in which he is the target. That
examination also discloses how the naïve realist views held by the litigants,
press, and public color the manner in which they respond, which engenders a
more confrontational reply from the targeted jurist. In other words, the
problems with these disqualification disputes follow the same pattern of
thoughts and behaviors that lead to a bias-perception conflict spiral.
255. Id. at 434a.
256. See, e.g., Peter Geier, Recusal Fight Highlights Judicial Election Concerns, NAT’L L.
REV., Apr. 24, 2006, at 6 (stating that “[a] West Virginia high court judge . . . declined to recuse
himself from hearing the appeal of a $50 million judgment against a company—despite the fact
that its owner contributed at least $3 million to the judge’s election” and quoting others critical of
the decision or calling for the need to reform the disqualification process to address electionspecific challenges); Adam Liptak, Case Studies: West Virginia and Illinois, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2006, at A23; Adam Liptak, The Worst Courts for Businesses? It’s a Matter of Opinion, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 24, 2007, at A10 (reviewing the failure of Justice Benjamin to recuse himself and
suggesting that West Virginia Supreme Court judicial decisions should be judged more critically
because of it).
257. This would be a reasonable inference to draw from Justice Benjamin’s behavior in light
of the fact that he applied the wrong legal standard and provided little analysis to support his
decision. In fact, at least one well-known scholar suggested that “[Justice Benjamin’s]
performance cries out for at least some consequential discipline and could arguably support
impeachment.” Stempel, supra note 18, at 9.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

280

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII:235

H. The Disqualification Dispute Becomes Deeper and Darker
During the pendency of the appeal, the Caperton parties also sought the
disqualification of Chief Justice Maynard based upon his personal connections
with Massey’s CEO and Chairman.258 Caperton’s motion alleged that Justice
Maynard was seen dining with Blankenship on November 8, 2007, which was
less than a month after oral argument in the appeal and “less than three weeks
before [the WVSC] issued its majority opinion, in which Justice Maynard
joined, overturning the judgment against [Massey].”259 Thus, Caperton called
upon Justice Maynard to discharge his obligations under the West Virginia
Code of Judicial Conduct260 and disclose “full and complete details . . . of his
personal relationship with Mr. Blankenship, as well as the nature of the
discussions [the two had] at this [dinner] or any other meeting during the
pendency of this matter before [the WVSC].”261 In addition, Caperton
requested that if Justice Maynard had actually met with Blankenship while the
case was pending before the Court, then Justice Maynard should recuse
himself from any further proceedings and withdraw his outcome-determinative
vote in the opinion that reversed the jury verdict in favor of Caperton.262
The request to step aside largely was based upon the justice’s duty to
“disqualify himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality
might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where
. . . the judge has personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.”263 However,
Caperton also sought Chief Justice Maynard’s disqualification based upon his
alleged failure to: (1) avoid impermissible ex parte communications;264 (2)
conduct all extra-judicial activities so that they do not cast doubt on the judge’s
capacity to act impartially;265 and (3) refrain from permitting his social and

258. The Caperton parties made their first request that Chief Justice Maynard step aside just a
few weeks after a majority of the WVSC (including Maynard and Benjamin) voted to reverse the
$50 million jury verdict and remand the case and while the Caperton parties’ petitions for
rehearing were pending. See Hugh M. Caperton’s Motion for Disqualification Directed to Justice
Elliott E. Maynard, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223 (W.Va. 2008) (No.
33350) [hereinafter Caperton’s Motion for Disqualification of Chief Justice Maynard]. Note that
this motion is not included in the record on appeal to SCOTUS, but other documents in that
record do contain references to the motion and its contents. See, e.g., Renewed Motion to
Disqualify Justice Benjamin, supra note 224, at 434a–35a.
259. Caperton’s Motion for Disqualification of Chief Justice Maynard, supra note 258, at 1.
260. “A judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or
their lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification, even if the judge believes
there is no real basis for disqualification.” W. VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(E)(1),
commentary (1993) (emphasis added).
261. Caperton’s Motion for Disqualification of Chief Justice Maynard, supra note 258, at 2.
262. Id. at 6–7.
263. Id. at 4 (citing W. VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(E)(1) (2013)).
264. Id. at 5 (citing W. VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(B)(7) (2013)).
265. Id. (citing W. VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 4(A) (2013)).
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other relationships to influence the judge’s conduct or convey an impression of
such influence.266 Thus, Caperton sought relief on multiple grounds—not just
the appearance-of-bias standard—and the request that Maynard step aside was
based on a myriad of facts allegedly demonstrating the jurist’s improper
behavior and possible bias.
Justice Maynard did not respond to the allegations of improper connection
contained in the original disqualification motion. Nor did he disclose the
details of his contacts with Blankenship during the time the appeal was
impending or pending before the WVSC.267 However, his lack of response to
this motion became moot because on January 14, 2008, seven days after the
initial motion, Caperton filed an amended motion seeking to disqualify Chief
Justice Maynard because of solid new evidence of additional contacts between
the jurist and Blankenship.268 Following revelation of the ex parte contacts
between Justice Maynard and Blankenship, the corporate Caperton parties filed
a similar motion three days later on January 17, 2008, seeking relief on nearly
identical grounds.269
The amended disqualification motion alleged that the previously revealed
November 8, 2007, dinner in Logan, West Virginia, was “but one of many
dinner meetings between [Justice Maynard and Blankenship] at critical
junctures in the [appeal] proceedings.”270 In addition, the amended motion
charged that Justice Maynard and Blankenship had spent time together while
on vacation in the French Riviera in the summer of 2006, while the case was
pending before the WVSC.271 The motion also included thirty-four
photographs evidencing these meetings between the men while vacationing
abroad.272 In fact, the time and date stamps on the photographs reflected that
the two men spent at least part of three days together in July 2006, while the
appeal was impending.273 Thus, Caperton’s call for Chief Justice Maynard to

266. Id. (citing W. VA. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 2(B) (2013)).
267. See Caperton’s Motion for Disqualification of Chief Justice Maynard, supra note 258, at
2.
268. Hugh M. Caperton’s Amended Motion for Disqualification Directed to Chief Justice
Elliot E. Maynard at 1–3, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 679 S.E.2d 223 (W.Va. 2008) (No.
33350) [hereinafter Caperton’s Amended Motion for Disqualification of Maynard]. Note that this
motion is not included in the record on appeal to SCOTUS, but other documents in that record do
contain references to the motion and its content. See, e.g., Renewed Motion to Disqualify Justice
Benjamin, supra note 224, at 434a–35a.
269. Renewed Motion to Disqualify Justice Benjamin, supra note 224, at 432a–37a.
270. Caperton’s Amended Motion for Disqualification of Maynard, supra note 268, at 1–2.
271. Id. at 2.
272. Id.
273. See id. Apparently, some of the photographs contained images of female companions
traveling along with the two men, and were, therefore, filed under seal. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

282

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXXII:235

disclose his contacts with Blankenship was soon overtaken by these new
revelations of dinner meetings and a trip abroad.274
The very next day, Justice Maynard responded by issuing a press statement
in which he vowed to “file a written response promptly to the [disqualification]
motion.”275 Justice Maynard did not deny the ex parte contacts that were
evidenced by the photographs.276 Rather, he merely denied any wrong doing.
In fact, Justice Maynard specifically decried that: “The suggestion I have done
something improper is nonsense.”277 In other words, Justice Maynard
disagreed with other’s perception of those ex parte contacts with the Massey
CEO and Chairman because Justice Maynard subjectively construed those
facts differently.
Justice Maynard also strongly denied that his personal connection with the
CEO and Chairman of Massey Coal had actually affected any of his decisions
on the Court: “Like most judges I don’t reward my friends, or punish my
enemies from the bench. I have never denied my friendship with Mr.
Blankenship. Our friendship has never influenced any decision I’ve made for
the Court.”278
Justice Maynard went on to imply that the meeting in the French Riviera
with Blankenship was not improper because Maynard had paid for his own
trip: “I paid my own way, paid for my travel expenses, paid my own hotel
expenses out of my own pocket. I have receipts and records to prove it.”279
While Justice Maynard may have paid for his trip and he may not have ever
denied his friendship with Blankenship, he certainly did not voluntarily
disclose the European vacation or the dinners he had with the Massey CEO and
Chairman.280 Nor did Justice Maynard volunteer any details of those or any
other ex parte contacts with Blankenship that occurred while the appeal was
pending before the WVSC.281 Instead, Justice Maynard left it to the party
against whom he had voted on appeal to discover the contacts the jurist had
with the CEO and Chairman of the prevailing party.282 Thus, Justice Maynard

274. See id.
275. Renewed Motion to Disqualify Justice Benjamin, supra note 224, at 440a.
276. Id. at 440a–41a.
277. Id. at 440a.
278. Id. at 440a–41a.
279. Id. at 441a.
280. Order of Justice Starcher Regarding Recusal, reprinted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal
Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 456a–57a (2009) (No. 08-22) (“The two vacationed in Europe together
at the very time that this case was pending before the Court, and who knows what else? The
details of that relationship and that vacation have still not been fully disclosed or independently
investigated—and they should be.”)
281. Id. at 456a.
282. Renewed Motion to Disqualify Justice Benjamin, supra note 224, at 434a–35a.
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left himself open to suspicions by reasonable others regarding the nature of his
contacts with an interested party and the propriety of his conduct.
Moreover, Justice Maynard’s statements proclaiming his impartiality
despite the ex parte contacts completely miss the mark because they are aimed
at defending a claim that Justice Maynard was actually biased. However,
actual bias is not the proper legal standard nor was it the focus of the Caperton
disqualification motions.283 In fact, the Caperton motion sought Justice
Maynard’s disqualification because a judge is duty bound to “disqualify
himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where . . . the
judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.”284 Thus, Justice
Maynard’s initial response seems totally blind to the possibility—indeed the
probability—that his conduct reasonably could be viewed by a well-informed
person as casting doubts on the jurist’s impartiality.
In fact, it appears that Justice Maynard—like Justice Benjamin285—made
not only a legal error in applying the wrong standard but an error in judgment
caused by his Bias Blind Spot. Instead of stepping back and seeing the
situation from the perspective of another reasonable, informed person (which
the law obligated him to do) Justice Maynard made the decision based upon his
own perceptions of his own bias. As we have seen, this introspective approach
invites other serious problems as well.
First, using introspection as a means of assessing one’s own bias means the
jurist likely will become more convinced of his objectivity.286 Second, this
belief he is unbiased may also be reinforced merely because his impartiality is
being challenged and that challenge is assessed from a biased viewpoint.287
There is some possibility that the challenged jurist could review the objective
facts, including his own conduct288 rather than his thoughts, feelings, and

283. Caperton’s Motion for Disqualification of Chief Justice Maynard, supra note 258, at 5-6.
(In fact, the motion alleges Justice Maynard breached his ethical duties when he failed to take
other steps to maintain his impartiality: (1) avoid impermissible ex parte communications;
(2) conduct all extra judicial activities so they do not cast doubt on the judge’s capacity to act
impartially; and (3) refrain from permitting his social and other relationships to influence the
judge’s conduct or convey an impression of such influence.)
284. Id. at 4.
285. This is the same mistake that Justice Benjamin made. See supra notes 225–51
(discussing Justice Benjamin’s improper use of introspection to assess his impartiality when the
legal standard requires another perspective).
286. See supra notes 122–40 (discussing the Introspection Illusion).
287. See supra notes 116–21 (discussing Confirmation Biases).
288. In his press release, Chief Justice Maynard also promised to “address the specific
allegations [of the disqualification motion] separately” at a later time. Renewed Motion to
Disqualify Justice Benjamin, supra note 224, at 441a. However, Justice Maynard never provided
any detailed explanation of his conduct or his contacts with Blankenship that had come to light.
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beliefs about his impartiality. Unfortunately, given the cognitive illusions
created by the Bias Blind Spot—we rarely “see” the situation of our own
biases the same way as reasonable others do.
Despite his initial protestations that he did nothing wrong, Justice Maynard
eventually did step down—but not because he agreed with others’ assessment
of his bias.289 Interestingly, Justice Maynard’s memo explaining his decision to
not participate in further proceedings in no way denies any of the facts alleged
in Caperton’s disqualification motions—the dinner meetings with Blankenship
or the time spent together while on vacation in the French Riviera.290
Nevertheless, Justice Maynard makes clear he believed that—in spite of his
connections and contacts with Blankenship—he had been and could continue
to be fair and impartial in the case: “I will recuse myself despite the fact I have
no doubt in my own mind and firmly believe I have been and would be fair and
impartial in this case. I know that of a certainty.”291 Rather, Justice Maynard
stated that he stepped aside because the disqualification dispute had “become
an issue of public perception and public confidence in the courts.”292 Justice
Maynard went on to say that his recusal was necessary not because of actual
bias but due to appearances: “The mere appearance of impropriety, regardless
of whether it is supported by fact, can compromise the public confidence in the
courts. For that reason—and that reason alone—I will recuse myself from this
case.”293
Although his order contains a clear declaration of his innocence of any
wrongdoing—it seems that even Justice Maynard could not ignore the
objective facts presented by the photographs and other evidence, as well as the
negative press about the connection294 captured in those pictures. In other

But, the demand for disclosure became a moot point when the photographs of Justice Maynard
and Blankenship were made a part of the record of the case.
289. Order of Chief Justice Maynard Regarding Recusal reprinted in Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 447a (2009) (No. 08-22).
290. Id.
291. Id. The order on page 448a states that Maynard “voluntarily” disqualified himself and
cites Canon 3(E)(1)(d). However, that provision does not seem to apply on these facts. Instead, it
requires recusal when “the judge or the judge’s spouse, or a person within the third degree of
relationship* to either of them, or the spouse of such a person is (i) a party to the proceeding, or
an officer, director or trustee, of a party; (ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (iii) is known
by the judge to have a more than de minimis interest that could be substantially affected by the
proceeding; or (iv) is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.”
*The editor’s notes to the CJC do not indicate it has been amended since this order of
disqualification was entered.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See e.g., Ben Fields, Maynard Trip Raising More Questions: Chief Justice Says He Did
Nothing Improper, HERALD DISPATCH, Jan. 16, 2008, at 1A, 7A, available at http://www.heralddispatch.com/elections/x1619683909; Adam Liptak, Trip to Europe has Repurcussions in West
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words, it seemed Justice Maynard had little choice but to step down—but did
so only as he continued to protest his innocence.
Even as he stepped aside, Justice Maynard acted as any naïve realist would
under similar circumstances. Justice Maynard’s reasons for recusing himself
clearly demonstrate that the jurist clung to the belief that he had been and
would continue to be objective. Also, Justice Maynard suggested that others
who disagreed with him and believed he might be biased simply were not well
informed: “regardless of whether [the appearance of impropriety] is supported
by fact.”295 In addition, Justice Maynard implied those who harbored doubts
about his impartiality were not being reasonable: “The suggestion I have done
something improper is nonsense.”296 It seems that Justice Maynard chose to
resolve the cognitive dissonance not by conceding that it would be reasonable
for others to harbor doubts about his impartiality given Justice Maynard’s
connections and contacts with Blankenship, which the jurist had failed to
reveal.297 Rather, Justice Maynard resolved the cognitive dissonance by
inferring those who disagreed did not “see” how the world “really is” because
there was something wrong with them—a classic response predicted by Naïve
Realism.298
Unfortunately, Naive Realism (and the more particular brand we are
discussing—the Bias Blind Spot) does not merely affect the way that a judge
or justice views his or her own impartiality—it can affect the psychology of the
entire case. That is what appears to have happened when Justice Maynard
initially responded to the Caperton disqualification motions. Given the content
and tone of the rest of the press release, Justice Maynard’s promise to “address
the specific allegations [of the disqualification motion] separately” seems less
like a promise to provide a reasoned response to the motions and more like a
vow that he will disprove the allegations of bias. In fact, the entire press
release reveals a combative approach and goes so far as to say the basis for the
disqualification motions is “nonsense.”299 This reflects an attitude that is hardly
a model of judicial temperament that is expected and needed to preside over a
case while maintaining at least the appearance of impartiality. Undoubtedly,
this intemperate attitude would have affected the litigation had Justice
Maynard continued to serve on the case.
Of course, Justice Maynard’s initial defensive response to Caperton’s
disqualification motions is easily predicted by the social psychological studies.

Virginia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2008, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/15/
us/15court.html?_r=0.
295. Order of Chief Justice Maynard Regarding Recusal, supra note 289, at 447a.
296. Renewed Motion to Disqualify Justice Benjamin, supra note 224, at 440a.
297. Id. at 432a–39a.
298. See Pronin et al., supra note 97, at 783.
299. Renewed Motion to Disqualify Justice Benjamin, supra note 224, at 440a.
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In fact, the way the scenario played out was exactly like a classic BiasPerception Conflict Spiral.300 In such situations, the first step is that A
perceives B as biased (Caperton perceives Maynard as biased), A then acts
aggressively (in filing both the original and the more strongly worded amended
motions for disqualification), B perceives A as biased (Maynard calls
suggestions of his lack of impartiality “nonsense”), and then B acts
aggressively (Maynard vows to disprove the allegations and seems ready to
fight the litigant). The next step in this conflict spiral is A perceives B as
biased—which is the first step in the pattern of combative behavior.301 The
cycle then repeats until the gap between the sides is so wide that there is no
room for respectful disagreement or a resolution.
Thankfully, this is not what happened in this instance because Justice
Maynard was able to take a step back—he was able to refocus just enough to
see that in his initial response to the disqualification motion he had overlooked
something important: the legal standard. Perhaps when Justice Maynard
reflected on his thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and motivations—his introspection
revealed he actually did have a bias towards his friend Don Blankenship and
Massey—though Justice Maynard denies that explanation. Possibly, it was
Justice Maynard’s thirty years of experience as a public servant—including
time on the bench—that gave him the necessary perspective to understand that
continuing down the path he initially chose likely would damage his reputation
even more than the photographs and other allegations of misconduct ever
could. Perchance, a trusted colleague or friend who the jurist believed to be
intelligent, informed, and impartial offered some sound advice that motivated
Justice Maynard to see that recusal was both legally and ethically necessary.
Maybe it was simply that the din of criticism was too loud for Justice Maynard
to ignore any longer. We likely will never know what caused Justice Maynard
to shift his focus from his own subjective thoughts and beliefs about his lack of
bias to view the question of the appearance of impartiality from a third parties’
perspective. But we do know, based upon the social science, that shift in
perspective is rare. Instead, most often, the systematic error introduced by the
Bias Blind Spot is not corrected and the challenged jurist remains genuinely—
though naïvely—convinced of his objectivity.
I.

The “Cancer On the Court” Causes Starcher to Step Aside

On the other side, Massey sought recusal of Justice Starcher based upon
both an alleged actual personal bias against Massey and Blankenship and the
appearance of bias. Massey alleged that Justice Starcher’s public criticism of
Blankenship's role in the 2004 elections reflected an actual bias or at least

300. See Pronin, supra note 87, at 40.
301. Id.
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created the appearance of bias against a party litigant.302 Specifically, the
motion to disqualify Justice Starcher charged that the jurist had a “personal
bias and prejudice . . . that [was] well known throughout West Virginia.”303
Given the public nature of the disagreement, Massey called upon Justice
Starcher to step aside because his animosity “reasonably call[ed] into question
[Justice Starcher’s] ability to render an objective ruling” in the matter.304
In addition, Massey argued that if Justice Starcher continued to participate
in the case in spite of the appearance of bias created by his public criticisms of
Massey and Blankenship, that would harm not only Massey’s interests in the
specific case, but public confidence in the courts: “Of equal import is not only
the absence of actual bias, but also the appearance that the process is free of
bias. [Thus], to perform its high function in the best way ‘[j]ustice must satisfy
the appearance of justice.’ Public respect for the judiciary demands this
result.”305 Relying on an appearance of bias standard, Massey moved for
Justice Starcher to step aside.
In support of its position that Justice Starcher was disqualified, Massey
relied upon both federal and state law standards. In its motion, Massey cited
portions of the West Virginia Code of Judicial Conduct that requires recusal
when the judge holds a “personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.”306
Massey also relied upon parts of the state judicial code that makes
disqualification mandatory due to “any public or nonpublic comment [made by
the judge] about any pending or impending proceeding which might
reasonably be expected to affect its outcome or impair its fairness.”307 In
addition, Massey claimed that its state and federal rights to Due Process would
be violated if Justice Starcher did not step aside, but, instead, participated in
the appeal.308 Thus, Massey argued that given his past conduct Justice Starcher
was disqualified under both applicable state and federal law and duty bound to
step down.
In support of these legal claims, Massey provided over twenty-five pages
of speeches, newspaper articles, and transcripts from public television and

302. Motion for Disqualification of Justice Starcher at 7, A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. v.
Caperton, No. 33350 (W. VA. Apr. 6, 2006); see also Order of Justice Starcher Regarding
Recusal, reprinted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 454a (2009) (No.
08-22).
303. Motion For Disqualification of Justice Starcher, supra note 302, at 1.
304. Id. at 1–2.
305. Id. at 2–3 (citing Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc., 458 S.E.2d 374, 386
(W. Va. 1995).
306. Id. at 2 (citing W. VA. CODE JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(E)(1)(a) (2013)).
307. Id. at 7 (citing W. VA. CODE JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3(A)(9) (2013)).
308. Id. at 10 (citing Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986); In re Matter of Hey,
425 S.E.2d 221(W. Va. 1992)).
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radio interviews.309 These materials reflect that at various times before, during,
and after the 2004 election contest between Justice McGraw and Brent
Benjamin for a seat on the WVSC, Justice Starcher called Blankenship a
variety of names in one speech Starcher used the disparaging labels of
“outsider,” “stupid,” and a “clown”310 to describe the Massey CEO and
Chairman: “I think [Blankenship’s] a clown, and he’s an outsider, and he’s
running around this state trying to buy influence like buying candy for
children. And, I think its [sic] disgusting . . . . He’s stupid. He doesn’t know
what he is talking about.”311
In addition, Justice Starcher suggested that Blankenship provided financial
and other support to elect Brent Benjamin in an effort to curry favor in matters
involving Massey that were impending or pending before the WVSC:
Justice McGraw was not opposed in the general election by some neophyte
lawyer named Brent Benjamin. He was opposed by a Richmond, Virginia,
resident named Don Blankenship who poked $4 million into defeating Justice
McGraw [for a seat on the West Virginia] Supreme Court . . . . So really, the
election was bought, the seat was purchased on our Supreme Court and I’m
highly offended by it. I’m highly offended by the obscene use of out-of-state
money . . . to purchase a seat on our Supreme Court . . . . [T]hey tried to
purchase a seat on our Supreme Court, and they succeeded.
Coincidentally, Massey Coal, [of] which Don Blankenship is CEO, has a $60
million case on appeal in our court at this time. He has also – his coal company
has more EPA violations than all other coal companies put together in West
Virginia. [Don Blankenship] has a very special interest in owning a seat on the
312
[West Virginia] Supreme Court.

Massey’s motion also cited to additional examples of Justice Starcher’s
personal animus towards Massey and its CEO and Chairman, Don
Blankenship. One particularly unusual piece of evidence was an ex parte
communication that Justice Starcher sent to Don Blankenship while appeals
involving Massey (not including the Caperton matter) were pending before the
WVSC.313 The package of materials sent to the Massey CEO and Chairman
included a copy of Justice Starcher’s curriculum vitae and a short

309. Motion For Disqualification of Justice Starcher, supra note 302, at 11–39 (Exhibits “A”“I”).
310. Justice Starcher later recanted these insulting remarks about Blankenship’s intelligence:
“I apologize for calling Mr. Blankenship ‘stupid’ and a ‘clown.’ He is obviously an intelligent
person. Intelligent people, however, can do stupid and clownish things – I should know.”
Memorandum on Renewed Joint Motion to Recuse the Honorable Larry V. Starcher, Massey
Energy Co. v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., Pre-Appeal No 07-185 (WVSC Apr 24, 2008).
311. Motion For Disqualification of Justice Starcher, supra note 302, at 6.
312. Id. at 5.
313. Id. at Ex. I.
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autobiography of the jurist bearing a sarcastic inscription,314 along with a
handwritten note on the official WVSC letterhead which read: “Dear Mr.
Blankenship – Some reading information to help you ‘keep the record
straight.’ (signed) Larry V. Starcher P.S. I paid the postage.”315
Justice Starcher did not dispute the evidence of his extra-judicial
statements and conduct, he simply declined to find the evidence sufficient to
require him to step aside. In fact, in his initial response to the request that he
recuse himself, Justice Starcher admitted he made intemperate remarks about
Massey: “True, I have said that in my opinion, Massey has not been a good
corporate citizen.”316 Justice Starcher’s characterization of his public remarks
about Massey and Blankenship is very charitable when compared to his actual
statements. For example, on the eve of the 2004 judicial election, Justice
Starcher made this prediction about the outcome of the contest between then
Justice McGraw and his opponent Brent Benjamin:
What we’re going to see is we’re gonna see Massey Coal . . . buy a seat on our
Supreme Court, and I’ll be very sad to sit on that Supreme Court for the next
four years, quite frankly. I hate to see out-of-state money be used in such an
obscene way as it was in this race to buy a seat on the [West Virginia]
317
Supreme Court and attempt to control it. It saddens me very much.

In light of this record, Justice Starcher would be hard pressed to deny that he
made disparaging remarks about Massey’s CEO and Chairman,
Blankenship.318 Nevertheless, in his initial response to the disqualification
motion, Justice Starcher seemed blind to the fact these statements were—when
viewed from the perspective of a reasonable other—evidence of bias against a
party.
Also, Justice Starcher noted the request was perhaps, the fifth motion to
disqualify him filed on behalf of Massey Energy Company, its subsidiaries,
and Don Blankenship, CEO of Massey, based upon Justice Starcher’s negative
public comments.319 Justice Starcher also referred to the reasons given in an
earlier memorandum addressing another Massey motion to disqualify him in a
different case.320 In that earlier ruling, Justice Starcher defended his decision

314. The autobiography, which included a photograph of Justice Starcher, bore this
handwritten inscription: “Best wishes to a ‘fine West Virginian’ —- (signed) L. Starcher 10-2705.” Id. at 36.
315. Id. at Ex. I.
316. Id. at Ex. D.
317. Motion For Disqualification of Justice Starcher, supra note 302, at Ex. C.
318. In connection with another Massey motion seeking Justice Starcher’s disqualification in
a different case on the same factual and legal grounds, Justice Starcher had denied making one of
the statements attributed to him and claimed another was taken out of context. See id. at Ex. D.
319. See Order of Justice Starcher Regarding Recusal, supra note 280, at 454a.
320. See id.
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that he was not disqualified on the grounds that his remarks about the Massey
parties were nothing more than personal opinions that he could put aside:
I read papers and form personal opinions as other people do . . . . [I have
opinions about smoking, murder and other crimes, child abuse and domestic
violence, as well as full enforcement of environmental laws.] So, as one can
see, this is not the first time I have been asked to sit in judgment of a party for
which I may have less than full respect — in the past I have decided such cases
321
in an impartial manner, and can do so in this case.

Of course, as the Massey movants pointed out, Justice Starcher’s analogy
was flawed because in each of those instances Justice Starcher had general
opinions about the subject matter of the litigation—not specific negative
impressions of particular litigants.322 Moreover, while Justice Starcher had
made public statements regarding his general positions in those other cases—
he certainly did not vilify specific litigants or parties affiliated with litigants
who had appeals pending before the court as he did in the Caperton matter.
Nevertheless, Justice Starcher decided—in spite of his intemperate public
comments, including those indicating his “disgust” of Blankenship’s efforts to
“purchase a seat on [the West Virginia] Supreme Court”323—that he need not
step aside because he was capable of being impartial. Justice Starcher
apparently reached that conclusion based upon the facts that he believed were
relevant to the question of his impartiality: “I have no financial interest in this
case, do not know any of the litigants, and certainly have never socialized with
any of the litigants, nor do I have any personal knowledge of the disputed facts
in this litigation.”324 Notably, not one of these statements justifying his
decision addresses Justices Starcher’s personal animus towards Massey or its
CEO and Chairman, Don Blankenship, or how that animus might create an
appearance of bias against the Massey companies or any other party affiliated
with Blankenship.325
Instead of evaluating the appearance of impartiality by assessing the
import of his public comments and other extra judicial conduct, Justice
Starcher appears to have evaluated his bias using internal evidence—his own
subjective beliefs about his impartiality. This introspective assessment of his
possible bias is reflected by his statement of assurances that Justice Starcher
believed he would act impartially: “I can fairly sit on this matter and correctly

321. Motion for Disqualification of Justice Starcher, supra note 302, at Ex. D.
322. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 6, Massey Energy Co. v. W. Va.
Supreme Court of Appeals, No. 2:06-0614 (S.D. W. VA. 2006).
323. Id. at 7, 9.
324. Memorandum on Motion for Disqualification of Justice Starcher, at 1, A.T. Massey Coal
Co., Inc. v. Hoke, Appeal No. 06-0936 (W. Va. May 2, 2006) [hereinafter Memo of Justice
Starcher on Disqualification].
325. See id.
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and fairly apply the law. [Thus,] I respectfully decline to step aside.”326 In
other words, Justice Starcher did not focus on the external evidence that a wellinformed reasonable other would evaluate to assess the jurists’ impartiality.
Instead of assessing the right evidence, Justice Starcher did what most Naïve
Realists do—he ignored his behavior and valued instead his own thoughts,
feelings, and beliefs about his impartiality.327 Not surprisingly, Justice
Starcher’s introspection apparently revealed no “taint of self-interest” or
“traces of guilty bias” because our self-interested biases are largely
unconscious.328 Thus, Justice Starcher found—as he had the five prior times—
that he held no “legally disqualifying personal bias” against Blankenship or the
Massey parties and concluded that he need not step aside: “Therefore, I again
respectfully decline to recuse myself from this matter pursuant to Rule 29 of
our Rules of Appellate Procedure.”329 Of course, this means Justice Starcher
failed to apply the legal standard correctly as the appearance of bias standard
asks whether a reasonable third party who is well-informed of all the relevant
facts would likely harbor doubts about the jurist’s impartiality.330
In addition to making the same errors in judgment that his brethren
Benjamin and Maynard had made, Justice Starcher also compounded the
problem by suggesting there was something wrong, not with him, but with
those others who did not see things “as they really are.”331 In other words,
Justice Starcher attributed biased motives to his opponent—stating that
Massey’s CEO and Chairman, Don Blankenship had created the recusal
controversy by initiating a public campaign to “take [him] out” in 2008 when
Starcher would be up for re-election.332 Justice Starcher went on to
characterize those statements as part of an effort to create an appearance of
impartiality that would require him to step aside by saying such statements by
Blankenship, which were “designed to create a controversy between him and
me, should not be permitted to become a vehicle to force me from sitting as a
jurist in the [Caperton] case.”333 Apparently, Justice Starcher reasoned that he
had no duty to step aside when a party affiliated with the litigant that sought
his disqualification had created the controversy that led to an alleged
appearance of bias on his part. In other words, Justice Starcher concluded as
most Naïve Realists do: since I am not biased and they don’t agree with me

326. Id.
327. Pronin, supra note 87, at 38 (discussing how we use less reliable introspective
“evidence” to assess our own biases while evaluating others’ behavior to assess their biases).
328. Id. (discussing the unreliability of introspection and unconscious affects of bias).
329. Memo of Justice Starcher on Disqualification, supra note 324, at 2.
330. Tennant v. Marion Health Care Found., 459 S.E.2d 374, 385 (W. Va. 1995).
331. See Motion for Disqualification of Justice Starcher, supra note 302, at Ex. D.
332. Memo of Justice Starcher on Disqualification, supra note 324, at 1.
333. Id.
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that I am not biased—there must be something wrong with them—they must
be biased.
It also is clear that Justice Starcher surrendered to another Naïve Realist
tendency when he evaluated the disqualification motion: biased assimilation of
new evidence or the Confirmation Bias. First, he overlooked some important
facts about his own behavior. Justice Starcher did not dispute and even
admitted that he made comments about Blankenship—including public
pronouncements that called into question the Massey CEO and Chairman’s
intelligence, integrity, and motives.334 Most people would likely characterize
these remarks as reflecting a personal bias against the target of the comments.
However, Justice Starcher succumbed to the Confirmation Bias when he
downplayed that evidence, which was inconsistent with his pre-existing
conviction that he could be objective.335 In addition, Justice Starcher
spotlighted Blankenship’s statements as evidence of his opponent’s bias
against him336—another way in which the jurist confirmed his biased view of
his own impartiality. This selective assimilation of new information confirmed
the conclusion Justice Starcher had already reached: there was nothing wrong
with him—but his opponent was biased.
This is not to say that Justice Starcher was not sincere in his perception of
his own bias and his perception that his opponents were motivated by selfinterest. In fact, that is exactly what the Bias Blind Spot helps us to understand:
in spite of our tendency to attribute a lack of information, intelligence, or
impartiality to a jurist who does not step aside when we believe he should
recuse—those judges often are genuinely convinced of their objectivity. Naïve
Realism also suggests that it would be very difficult—if not impossible—for a
jurist in such circumstances to put aside his personal bias against a litigant.
This is true partly because our self-interested motivations and biases are
largely unconscious.337 In other words, even if Justice Starcher were “trying
hard to be fair,” those efforts to minimize his personal bias against Massey’s
CEO and Chairman likely would backfire.338 They could even make the
situation worse because in that instance the illusion of objectivity combines
with the motivation to be impartial to reaffirm the conviction that the Naïve
Realist is being unbiased.339 Thus, in spite of “trying hard to be fair” it is

334. See id. at 454a, 460a.
335. See id. at 454a–55a.
336. Id. at 455a–56a.
337. See Pronin, supra note 87, at 38. This is, of course, why our self-interested biases and
motivations remain undetected even after we evaluate our conscious thoughts, feelings, and
beliefs. Id. (explaining Introspection Illusion).
338. Cynthia Frantz, I AM Being Fair: The Bias Blind Spot as a Stumbling Block to Seeing
Both Sides, 28 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 157, 158 (2006) (discussing backfiring effect of
efforts to correct for liking or disliking somebody).
339. Id.
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unlikely that Justice Starcher could have remained impartial and there is a
danger he would become more combative.
In fact, it appears that is exactly what happened—the dispute became a
conflict—at least up to the point when Justice Starcher finally stepped aside. In
each of his memoranda denying recusal in other Massey cases, we see a
progression of increasing hostility and defensiveness. Even in the order in
which he agreed to withdraw from the case because he “had become part of the
problem,” Justice Starcher was still strident as he blamed Blankenship for
bringing to light the jurist’s criticisms of him:
Still, it is really the height of irony for the appellants to suggest that my public
statements about certain views and practices by the appellant’s CEO, Don
Blankenship, should disqualify me from participating in the decision of the
instant appeal.
In fact, it has been Mr. Blankenship who has gone out of his way to bring
public attention to my views about his "one rich man buys an election" tactics.
Mr. Blankenship even sported a "GetStarcher" ball cap announcing me as his
"next target" as he publicly celebrated spending millions to influence elections
in our State. As a judge I am limited in my public comments, but I do have a
constitutional right — and in fact a duty — to speak out on matters affecting
the administration of justice. And let me be clear about this: I believe Mr.
Blankenship’s conduct does have an effect on the administration of justice, in
340
that it has become a pernicious and evil influence on that administration.

The irony is that Justice Starcher seemingly still did not understand that he had
created the appearance that he was biased—by making disparaging public
remarks about Massey and its CEO and Chairman.
While Justice Starcher may not have been clear about how his own
conduct would cause a well-informed person to have reasonable doubts about
the jurist’s impartiality—he certainly had no difficulty discerning the bias of
his colleagues. In fact, Justice Starcher’s order on recusal not only impugns
Justice Maynard’s integrity, but it insinuates Justice Benjamin is acting without
integrity, as well:
Additionally, shortly before this case was appealed to this Court, another
justice ran an election campaign in 2004 that was supported by somewhere
around $4,000,000 from Mr. Blankenship and/or Massey associates. So far that
justice has refused to recognize that this fact has a bearing even on his
perceived impartiality. That justice not only remains on this case, as well as
other Massey cases before the Court, but that justice continues at this time to
341
appoint replacement judges in all Massey cases.

Justice Starcher goes on to urge Justice Benjamin to step aside as well—
noting that “Blankenship's bestowal of his personal wealth, political tactics,
340. Order of Justice Starcher Regarding Recusal, supra note 280, at 455a–56a.
341. Id. at 457a.
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and ‘friendship’ have created a cancer in the affairs of this Court.”342 While
Justice Starcher’s call for Justice Benjamin to step aside may have been correct
under the “objective” facts—the focus on Justice Benjamin’s possible bias at a
time when Justice Starcher still seems unable to see his own behavior clearly
highlights the asymmetries in perception of bias in self and in others the Bias
Blind Spot produces.
J.

Justice Benjamin Again Decides He is Not Disqualified In Spite of A
Public Opinion Poll That Suggests Otherwise

Following the recusals of Justice Maynard and Justice Starcher, a new
panel of justices was constituted to rehear the appeal. Then, Justice Benjamin,
now acting as Chief Justice of the WVSC, selected Circuit Judge Cookman and
Judge Fox to replace the disqualified Justices. In March 2008, before the newly
reconstituted panel issued its ruling, the Caperton parties requested for a third
time that Justice Benjamin step aside and not participate in the appeal.343
That last Caperton disqualification motion went further than just arguing
Justice Benjamin had failed to apply the correct standard for recusal under
West Virginia law. The renewed motion again sought Justice Benjamin’s
recusal under applicable state judicial code and pointed out that Justice
Benjamin had applied the wrong legal test.344 In addition, the Caperton parties
also included additional evidence to support a finding that a reasonable person
well-informed of the relevant facts would harbor doubts about Justice
Benjamin’s impartiality.345 Specifically, the Caperton parties had
commissioned a “well-regarded public opinion and market research firm” to
conduct a public opinion poll to determine whether the West Virginia public
would harbor doubts about Justice Benjamin’s impartiality.346 The survey
indicated that over 67 percent of West Virginians doubted Justice Benjamin
would be fair and impartial.347 This data, the Caperton parties contended,
further supported the conclusion that reasonable, well-informed others would
harbor doubts about Justice Benjamin’s impartiality and, thus, he had to step
aside.348
Notwithstanding this new public opinion information and the recent
examples provided by his brethren Justices Maynard and Starcher, Justice

342. Id. at 460a.
343. See Second Renewed Joint Motion for Disqualification of Justice Benjamin reprinted in
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 464a (2009) (08-22).
344. Id. at 466a (Caperton argued that “a reasonable and prudent person, knowing these
objective facts, would harbor doubts about Justice Benjamin’s ability to be fair and impartial.”).
345. Id. at 466a–67a.
346. Id. at 467a.
347. Id.
348. See id. at 464a–67a.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2013]

REFOCUSING RECUSALS

295

Benjamin again refused to withdraw. Just three days after the new
disqualification motion was filed, Justice Benjamin filed a memorandum
denying for the third time a request he recuse himself. 349 In his order, Justice
Benjamin not only repeated his flawed approach to the legal issue—but he
criticized the Caperton parties for filing the motion and introducing new
information at such a late date in the proceedings:
It is noted that this filing comes nearly four years after the 2004 race in which
this Justice was elected by the people of West Virginia; comes over seventeen
months after the filing of this appeal with this Court on October 24, 2006;
comes over four months after the initial decision of this Court on November
21, 2007, in which this Justice voted with the majority of the Court against the
interests of the joint appellees; comes over a month after supplemental briefs
were filed and considered on the reconsideration of this appeal; comes over
two weeks after oral arguments were heard on the reconsideration of this
appeal; and comes over two weeks after this Court’s Decision Conference on
this appeal’s reconsideration.
***
The said motion relies on arguments which relate to the 2004 campaign and
which could have been advanced in a timely manner, but have instead been
raised now, nearly four years after the 2004 race, during the pendency of a new
2008 political race. Citing no good cause for the delay in raising issues which
350
could have been earlier raised, the said motion is untimely.

While it is true that the third disqualification motion was filed nearly four
years after the election campaign and late in the appellate proceedings, it is a
misleading characterization of the record. In fact, the Caperton parties sought
Justice Benjamin’s disqualification nearly three years earlier—when the appeal
first came before the WVSC.351 Those initial motions—like the others that
followed—were based upon the same underlying facts and the same legal
standards for disqualification.352 The only thing new in Caperton’s third
request for recusal was the public opinion survey commissioned in response to
Justice Benjamin’s earlier criticisms of the lack of “objective” evidence
presented in support of his disqualification.353 Since the case was reargued
before a reconstituted panel—the motion, even the new evidence, was not
nearly as untimely as Justice Benjamin suggests. But, Justice Benjamin’s

349. Order of Justice Benjamin Regarding Recusal reprinted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 483a (2009) (08-22).
350. Id.
351. See generally Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 104a–320a; see
also 2d Caperton Benjamin Disqualification Motion, supra note 198, at 321a–35a.
352. See Motion for Disqualification of Justice Benjamin, supra note 198, at 106a–08a.
353. Second Renewed Joint Motion for Disqualification of Justice Benjamin, supra note 343,
at 466a–67a.
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characterization of the request as untimely, and his out of hand dismissal of the
new data reflect his Naïve Realist perspective that Caperton was biased against
him.
In addition, Justice Benjamin’s dismissal of the public opinion survey is
another example of his biased assimilation of new evidence that served to
confirm his conviction of his own impartiality. It also tended to polarize the
parties and their positions—creating a more combative exchange.354 Justice
Benjamin could have diffused the acrimony by evaluating the new public
opinion survey evidence on its merits. Instead he chose to make little serious
effort to evaluate the data or methodology of the survey and merely concluded
that: “[The] ‘survey’ which appears to be a ‘push poll’ specifically designed
with limited information for the purpose of supporting the instant
[disqualification] motion, is, as a matter of law, neither credible nor
sufficiently reliable to serve as the basis for an elected judge's
disqualification.”355
While the survey may well have been of limited evidentiary value due to
flaws in the design,356 Justice Benjamin provides no legal authority, no legal
analysis, or any other credible basis for his conclusion that the data is
essentially inadmissible evidence as a matter of law. However, Justice
Benjamin gives us a clue for the real reason he rejected the survey data: he
believed it was “specifically designed with limited information for the purpose
of supporting the instant [disqualification] motion.”357 In other words, Justice
Benjamin believes the survey—commissioned by Caperton—was biased in
favor of Caperton, and he believes that without regard to the reputation of the
professionals who designed and conducted the survey or the methodology
used. Thus, Justice Benjamin dismisses new evidence that does not confirm his
previously held belief that he is unbiased. In doing so, Justice Benjamin is able
to resolve the cognitive dissonance that must have been created when he read
that nearly 75 percent of citizens of West Virginia questioned his
impartiality358—a much wider margin than his electoral victory.

354. See id. at 471a.
355. Order of Justice Benjamin Regarding Recusal, supra note 349, at 483a (emphasis
added).
356. The possible problems with the design of the survey were better explained by some
scholars and other commentators than Justice Benjamin. See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 18, at 40–
51 (2010) (explaining a “push poll” and questioning the validity of some aspects of the Caperton
survey design that may have influenced participant responses in favor of finding Justice Benjamin
should step aside).
357. Order of Justice Benjamin Regarding Recusal, supra note 349, at 483a (emphasis
added).
358. Second Renewed Joint Motion for Disqualification of Justice Benjamin, supra note 343,
at 471a, 477a, 481a.
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K. Justice Benjamin Is Criticized by His Colleagues for Participating
In April 2008, a divided WVSC again reversed the jury verdict, and again
it was a 3-to-2 decision in favor of Massey. Justice Davis filed a modified
version of her earlier opinion in which she supported the first reversal and
repeated the two earlier legal holdings on which that initial decision was
based.359 She was joined by Judge Fox and Justice Benjamin.360
Justice Albright, joined by Circuit Judge Cookman, dissented361 and
criticized the majority’s ruling and its analysis of the legal issues: “[n]ot only is
the majority opinion unsupported by the facts and existing [West Virginia]
case law, but it is also fundamentally unfair. Sadly, justice was neither honored
nor served by the majority.”362
The dissent not only criticized the legal holding reached by the majority,
but also called out Justice Benjamin for refusing to recuse. Although the
dissenters did not go so far as to state they believed that Justice Benjamin was
actually biased, they did suggest that Justice Benjamin’s failure to step aside
impacted the outcome and had created a genuine problem for the court:
Unfortunately, with true regret, we are unable to stand silent in the present
circumstances. Upon reviewing the cases of Aetna Life Insurance Company v.
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986), and In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed 942 (1955), it is clear
that both actual and apparent conflicts can have due process implications on
the outcome of cases affected by such conflicts. On the record before us, we
cannot say with certainty that those cases [mandating disqualification under the
Due Process Clause when a person has certain pecuniary interests in the
outcome] have application here. It is now clear, especially from the last motion
for disqualification filed [by Caperton against Justice Benjamin], that there are
now genuine due process implications arising under federal law, and therefore
363
under our law, which have not been addressed.

359. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 679 S.E.2d 223, 229–64 (W.Va. 2008); see also
Opinion of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals reprinted in Caperton v. A.T. Massey
Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 app. at 485a–580a (2009) (08-22).
360. Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 265; see also Opinion of the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, supra note 359, at 580a.
361. Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 265–85; see also Opinion of the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals, supra note 359, at 581a–634a.
362. Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 284; see also Opinion of the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals, supra note 359, at 633a.
363. Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 285, n.16 (Benjamin, C.J., concurring); Opinion of the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, supra note 359, at 633a (Justice Benjamin’s concurring
opinion also essentially defended his vote in support of the majority decision to reverse the $50
million jury verdict against Massey that had, with interest, grown to nearly $80 million.
Interestingly, Justice Benjamin wrote nineteen pages on the merits of the case—but took a total of
forty-six pages to defend his disqualification decision.).
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Justice Benjamin Responds to His Critics

Four months later in July 2008—over a month after Caperton filed its
petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court—Justice
Benjamin filed a concurring opinion in which he attempted to defend the
merits of his decision not to recuse himself.364 Justice Benjamin’s opinion
frames the question as one of “actual” justice—which he defines as “actual
impartiality in decision making [that] is conveyed in well-written legal
opinions which are founded in the rule of law.”365 Then, Justice Benjamin—
nearly four years after the issue was first joined—again applies the wrong legal
standard to decide whether he is disqualified.366
This last opinion—like the three earlier memoranda—contains the same
fundamental flaws in his legal analysis and judgment. First, Justice Benjamin
ignores the applicable state law standard, which does not require a showing of
actual bias as he suggests, but is an appearance of bias test.367 Second, he
places a higher and perhaps impossible burden of proof on the moving party to
show the jurist cannot be impartial rather than just whether one might harbor
doubts about impartiality.368 Third, Justice Benjamin again confuses his own
subjective belief about this impartiality with “objective” evidence of bias
(whether actual or apparent).369 In fact, Justice Benjamin goes on to reiterate
that he had no “direct, personal, substantial, pecuniary interest” in this case.370
Further, Justice Benjamin suggests that the challenge to his impartiality is
improperly motivated when he concludes that adopting “a standard merely of
‘appearances’ seems little more than an invitation to subject West Virginia's
justice system to the vagaries of the day—a framework in which predictability
and stability yield to supposition, innuendo, half-truths, and partisan
manipulations.”371
All of these mistakes in his legal analysis, along with the tone of most of
the orders on recusal and the last ditch effort to defend his disqualification
decision lead one to infer—as any Naïve Realist would—that Justice Benjamin
was not informed, was not acting intelligently, or was not actually impartial. In

364. Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 285 (Benjamin, C.J., concurring); Concurring Opinion of
Justice Benjamin, supra note 192, at 635a.
365. Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 285–86 (Benjamin, C.J., concurring).
366. Id. at 295–96.
367. Id. at 294–95, n.15.
368. Id. at 296.
369. See supra notes 225–51 and accompanying text (discussing flaws in legal analysis of
previous orders issued by Justice Benjamin refusing to recuse himself).
370. Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 300 (Benjamin, C.J., concurring ); Concurring Opinion of
Justice Benjamin, supra note 192, at 677a.
371. Caperton, 679 S.E.2d at 306; Concurring Opinion of Justice Benjamin, supra note 192,
at 692a.
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fact, at least one noted legal scholar has questioned Justice Benjamin in just
this manner:
Could it really be that after four years [Justice Benjamin] just did not “get it”
regarding the correct approach to judicial disqualification under the [West
Virginia Judicial] Code?
***
How could Justice Benjamin have erred so badly under these circumstances?
Three explanations seem possible: (1) despite his success, he is not particularly
bright or not a good legal analyst; (2) he was so emotionally upset over the
perceived attack on his integrity that he was unable to think straight
notwithstanding the passage of time and the factors regularly informing him of
the errors of his legal analysis; or (3) he committed knowing legal error in
order to attempt to justify impermissible favoritism toward a campaign
372
benefactor.”

There is, of course, one other possible, even probable, explanation: Justice
Benjamin—like Justice Maynard and Justice Starcher and the rest of us—has a
Bias Blind Spot. Justice Benjamin was convinced he could be impartial in this
case—a result that followed from the strong presumption of judicial
impartiality and that he naïvely believed to be an objective and unmediated
view of reality of his specific situation. He assumed well-informed and
reasonable others would agree with him. When instead they disagreed, Justice
Benjamin turned to introspection and—observing no “taint of self-interest” or
“traces of guilty bias”—confirmed his conviction of his own impartiality.
When presented with other evidence—external facts reflecting his behavior,
the surrounding circumstances, and the reactions of third parties—Justice
Benjamin dismissed or devalued that extrospective evidence, thereby
assimilating it in a way that confirmed his belief in his own objectivity. In
addition, he overlooked the other possible explanations for the cognitive
dissonance: (1) he was actually influenced by an non-conscious bias; or (2) his
“opponents” were not biased against him—they merely saw the situation
differently because they evaluated his possible bias based on his behavior, not
his internal thoughts, feelings, motives, and beliefs. As a result, Justice
Benjamin inferred that there was something wrong—not with his view of
himself—but with them—his opponents were biased.
Next, Justice Benjamin responded to this perceived bias by acting more
aggressively against the Caperton parties and his court colleagues who had
already leveled accusations of an appearance of bias against him. If the dispute
had continued, the parties likely would have become even more polarized and
more aggressive, thereby taking the disagreement to the next level in the Bias
Perception Conflict Spiral. Of course, most practitioners—judges and lawyers

372. Stempel, supra note 18, at 55, 57.
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alike—who have been involved in difficult cases in which disqualification
disputes arose know too well the strained relations that can be created when a
jurist’s impartiality is questioned—as that challenge goes to the core of judicial
identity. In order to avoid this escalation of tensions, we must find a way to
refocus recusal reform and make individual disqualification decisions more
meaningful and also limit the negative impact on the public’s confidence in the
judiciary.
IV. DIFFUSING DISQUALIFICATION DISPUTES BY REFOCUSING RECUSAL
REFORM
In short, . . . judges . . . strive for truth more often than we realize, and miss
that mark more often than they realize. Because the brain cannot see itself
fooling itself, the only reliable method for avoiding bias is to avoid the
situations that produce it.
Daniel Gilbert373
The application of naïve realist and other social science theories
underlying the Bias Blind Spot to the three disqualification decisions in
Caperton illustrates the most significant problem with current disqualification
practice and illuminates how we should refocus recusal reform. The problem is
that when a jurist is asked to be unbiased about his own biases most judges
simply are not able to do it—they cannot see their minds fooling them. This is
true because, as we have seen, the Bias Blind Spot operates on a non-conscious
level and is reinforced by a number of related cognitive illusions that operate
below our awareness, too. However, there is one viable and relatively easy
solution to this problem: avoid the situation by taking the challenged jurist out
of the decision-making process.374 In other words, we should adopt new
procedures for deciding disqualification disputes that would no longer permit a
man “to be a judge in his own [disqualification] case.”375
The addition of other procedural safeguards—such as requiring full
disclosure by the jurist and the parties, applying standard adversarial
procedures to the finding of facts, and developing a body of disqualification
law by requiring written opinions explaining disqualification—may be
373. Daniel Gilbert, I’m O.K., You’re Biased, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2006), http://www.ny
times.com/2006/04/16/opinion/16gilbert.html?pagewanted=all (Daniel Gilbert is Professor of
Psychology at Harvard University who researches and writes about hedonic psychology,
including affective forecasting and is the author of the New York Times Bestseller “Stumbling on
Happiness”).
374. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, JD, Ph.D, & Matthew Taksin, JD, Can Judges Determine Their
Own Impartiality?, 41 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 24, 24 (2010) (suggesting that, given the
“limitations inherent in judging one’s own biases,” a necessary recusal reform is to “avoid leaving
the recusal decision solely to the discretion of the challenged judge”).
375. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
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appropriate and even necessary to address other problems with disqualification
decisions. Also, changes in the substantive standard may be advisable—but
there appears to be no consensus on the rule of law for disqualification at this
time.376 So, the most effective and reliable way to address the problems created
by the Bias Blind Spot and the resulting Bias Perception Conflict Spiral is to
refocus our recusal reforms so as to entirely remove the challenged jurist as a
decision maker; or at least, not permit the jurist to be the sole or final arbiter of
the dispute and provide meaningful appellate review.
There are several ways that courts could reform the procedures used to
decide disqualification disputes that would avoid the problems created by the
Bias Blind Spot—including some procedures already in use in the state
courts.377 First, the courts could adopt the use of a limited number of
preemptory challenges—either with or without factual substantiation. Second,
the challenged jurist could be removed from the disqualification decision
entirely—by referring the decision to another judge, justice, or panel of
decision makers. Third, the challenged judge may be permitted to make an
initial decision regarding disqualification, but would be removed as the sole or
final arbiter by providing for prompt de novo review if the initial decision is
not to recuse. Each of these modified procedures has clear benefits—notably
the removal of the challenged jurist as the final arbiter of his own
disqualification decision. However, there are some costs as well, which must
be evaluated by the federal and state courts as they decide which specific
solution to adopt378 for each level or type of court.
This idea of requiring that the challenged jurist step aside certainly is not
new379 and may even seem obvious380 to others—at least those who do not sit

376. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
377. Gabriel D. Serbulea, Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The Need for Reform,
38 PEPP. L. REV. 1109, 1151 (2011) (including appendix summarizing recusal practice in all fifty
states).
378. It is entirely possible that, if the courts do not themselves adopt some type of procedural
solutions, state legislatures or Congress will mandate changes. See, e.g., Supreme Court
Transparency and Disclosure Act of 2011, H.R. 862, 112th Cong. (1st Sess.). However, whether
any of those attempts to legislate in this area would be valid exercises of legislative authority or
otherwise effective remains to be seen. See Louis J. Virelli, III, The (Un)Constitutionality of
Supreme Court Recusal Standards, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1181 (2011) (arguing that Congressional
attempts to define the recusal standards for SCOTUS violates the constitutional Separation of
Powers and offends federalism principles).
379. Note, Disqualification of a Judge on Grounds of Bias 41 HARV. L. REV. 78, 81 (1927)
(“A biased mind rarely realizes its own imperfection and would normally prevent that perfect
equipoise so desirable in our system of trial.”).
380. Stempel, supra note 80, at 794 (“The solution is obvious: recusal motions should be
heard and decided, even in first instance, by another trial judge in the relevant district. Where a
challenge targets an appellate judge, it should be heard and decided by other members of the
panel or, if necessary, by the court as a whole. Where the challenge targets a United States
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on the bench and make such decisions.381 In fact, several commentators and
academics have called for this precise type of procedural reform in the past382
and some commentators who have questioned the practice have even derisively
referred to the custom as “ironic”,383 “bizarre”,384 and “nonsensical.”385 These
criticisms have not been limited to a handful of legal academics—but are part
of an increasingly bitter public dialogue surrounding disqualification decisions
in high profile cases.386 In fact, “[o]ne of the most criticized features of recusal
practice is the fact that in many states [and at SCOTUS], the judge subject to a
recusal request has the unreviewable last word on whether to step aside from a
case.”387 Thus, it seems likely that implementing this single procedural
safeguard would go a long way toward addressing much of the public criticism
of current disqualification practices in specific cases and restoring confidence
in the judiciary as a whole.
In spite of these concerns and the clear calls for procedural reform of
recusal practices, the practice of allowing one to be a judge, in his own
disqualification case, still prevails in the majority of federal and state courts.388

Supreme Court Justice or a judge or justice of any other jurisdiction’s highest court, the
disqualification decision should be made by the entire court.”).
381. Of course, the suggestion that this proposed solution is obvious may—itself—be a naïve
realist expression of the “objective” reality perceived by those who believe this procedural reform
is the reasonable answer.
382. See, e.g., Frost, supra note 10, at 555–66 (arguing that having neutral judges make the
disqualification decision will create greater confidence in the judicial process); Geyh, supra note
40, at 690–713 (suggesting that, given lack of consensus on substantive disqualification
standards, procedural reforms are needed); Stempel, supra note 80, at 804–05 (arguing that
disqualification decisions made by the challenged jurist are suspect given a host of biasing
influences and a professional culture that creates reluctant recusants); ADAM SKAGGS & ANDREW
SILVER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, PROMOTING FAIR AND IMPARTIAL COURTS THROUGH
RECUSAL REFORM (2011), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/
Democracy/Promoting_Fair_Courts_8.7.2011.pdf.
383. Ross E. Davies, From the Bag: The Reluctant Recusants: Two Parables of Supreme
Judicial Disqualification, 10 GREEN BAG LIT. 79, 79 (2006).
384. John Leubsdorf, Theories of Judging and Judge Disqualification, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV.
237, 242 (1987).
385. Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 10, at 197.
386. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Health-care Case Brings Fight Over Which Supreme Court
Justices Should Decide It, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
health-care-case-brings-fight-over-which-supreme-court-justices-should-decide-it/2011/11/22/gI
QAwRWb2N_story.html (describing how House and Senate Democrats and Republicans called
for both Justice Kagan and Justice Thomas to step aside in appeal of the Affordable Care Act and
providing links to over 1,301 public comments on the subject).
387. SKAGGS & SILVER, supra note 382, at 3 (“It flies in the face of fundamental notions of
disinterested, impartial decision-making to allow a judge accused of bias to be the only one who
decides whether he or she should be disqualified.”).
388. FLAMM, supra note 17, at §17.6, 499–500; see also Leslie W. Abramson, Deciding
Recusal Motions: Who Judges the Judges? 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 543, 545–58 (1994) (“In a
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This is due to resistance by judges and justices to the idea that the challenged
jurist should be removed from the disqualification decision-making process.
The reasons given are somewhat varied, but can be reduced to three that
require serious responses. First, many jurists continue to strongly believe that
judges and justices are capable, because of their integrity, experience, and
intellect, to make the right decision when their impartiality is challenged.389
Second, others point to the availability of appellate review as a check on
incorrect disqualification decisions.390 Third, concerns are sometimes
expressed regarding the administrative burden of such procedural reforms.391
However, not one of these concerns should stand in the way of recusal
procedure reforms because the price to individual litigants’ rights and damage
to the reputation of our judiciary is simply too great.
First, the conviction, no matter how genuine, that jurists are capable of
making unbiased decisions about their own biases simply is not supported by
the scientific evidence.392 Unfortunately, jurists at even the highest levels of
the judiciary continue to believe they and their brethren are immune.393
However, the existence and affects of the Bias Blind Spot have not been
seriously challenged in any of the cognitive or social psychology studies done
to date.394 Also, there is no scientific evidence to support the belief that more
intelligent persons are less prone to the Bias Blind Spot. In fact, what little
evidence does exist on the subject supports the contrary conclusion and
explains that because these types of biases are non-conscious cognitive

majority of states, the decision of whether to grant or deny a motion to recuse is within the sound
discretion of the challenged judge.”).
389. Abramson, supra note 388, at 546–56.
390. Id. at 553–58.
391. See Serbulea, supra note 377, at 1145.
392. See supra notes 91–95 and accompanying text.
393. See, e.g., CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS, 2011 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2011year-endre
port.pdf (“I have complete confidence in the capability of my colleagues to determine when
recusal is warranted. They are jurists of exceptional integrity and experience whose character and
fitness have been examined through a rigorous appointment and confirmation process. I know
that they each give careful consideration to any recusal questions that arise in the course of their
judicial duties. We are all deeply committed to the common interest in preserving the Court’s
vital role as an impartial tribunal governed by the rule of law.”).
394. Perhaps it would be helpful if all state and federal jurists were educated about the Bias
Blind Spot—though research demonstrates that while such efforts might increase awareness of
the existence of this cognitive illusion there is no scientific support for the idea that education can
overcome the effects of the Bias Blind Spot. See Pronin & Kugler, supra note 127, at 566–67
(describing an experiment in which participants who were educated about the pitfalls of relying
on introspection as an effective method to determine our own biases tended to cease claiming
they were less prone to bias, but noting no actual impact on decision making); see also Frantz,
supra note 338, at 157 (discussing backfiring effect of efforts to educate others about unconscious
bias and correct for liking or disliking somebody).
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processes intelligence will have little or no impact.395 Moreover, the conviction
that judges are somehow immune to the cognitive processes that produce the
Bias Blind Spot simply does not resonant with the common sense views.396 In
other words, this naïve conviction that jurists are less prone to the Bias Blind
Spot is belied by a review of those disqualification disputes for which we do
have written reasons why the jurist did not step aside—cases like Caperton.
Thus, procedural reforms that prohibit the challenged jurist from being the sole
or final arbiter of his own biases should not be further stymied by this
misplaced confidence in a judge’s allegedly unique ability to clearly see
through the Bias Blind Spot and be unbiased about his own biases.
Second, the additional roadblock that has been erected is the claim that
those few mistakes in disqualification decisions that are made can be reviewed
and rectified on appeal. However, that presupposes the aggrieved party has the
necessary resources—time, energy, and money—to appeal the erroneous
decision. In addition, given the generous “abuse of discretion” standard used
for appeals from denial of disqualification, the likelihood of reversal is rather
low and certainly lower than would be the case if a de novo review standard
were applied.397 Also, plenty of disqualification disputes arise in the federal
appellate courts and state supreme courts—as happened in Caperton. As
acknowledged in Caperton, the likelihood of review of such decisions by
SCOTUS is remote and will only occur in extreme cases and even then often
will address only the “constitutional floor” imposed by minimal Due Process
standards.398 In other words, when a real probability or even actual bias is
present and the jurist does not step aside, the wrong will be rectified in only the

395. The idea that superior intellect may ameliorate the effects of the Bias Blind Spot on
certain cognitive functions has been the subject of recent scientific study. At least one such study
found that the Bias Blind Spot effect is “unmitigated by increases in intelligence” and this result
is “consistent with the idea that the mechanisms that cause the bias [blind spot] are quite
fundamental and not easily controlled strategically” because the cognitive mechanisms at work
are “evolutionary and computationally basic.” Richard F. West et al., Cognitive Sophistication
Does Not Attenuate Bias Blind Spot. 103 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 506, 515 (2012).
396. See Serbulea, supra note 377, at 1111–12, 1148, 1150. This is just another way to say
that those who believe that judges are immune from the effects of the Bias Blind Spot may be
honest in their belief, but we can only infer that they are not informed, not intelligent, or not
impartial on this subject. In other words, those who disagree and believe in the super human
ability of jurists to be unbiased about their biases “just don’t see the world the way it really is.”
Of course, this is exactly what a Naïve Realist would think.
397. Stempel, supra note 80, at 804–05 (arguing that abuse of discretion and harmless error
standards should be replaced by a de novo review because disqualification decisions made by the
challenged jurist is suspect given a host of biasing influences and a professional culture that
creates reluctant recusants).
398. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 889 (2009) (“The Due Process
Clause demarks only the outer boundaries of judicial disqualification.”).
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most extreme cases when the litigants are able to invest in prosecuting an
appeal.
Third, the administrative costs of the proposed reforms of recusal
procedures are far outweighed by the actual benefits in terms of denial of
litigants’ Due Process and the negative impact on public confidence in the
judiciary. Since a challenged jurist, like the rest of us, cannot be impartial
about his own impartiality, the risk of biased decisions is not limited to
“extraordinary circumstances”399 like those presented in Caperton. Rather, it is
a systematic error with which litigants (and their lawyers) must deal each and
every day in courts where the challenged jurist is the sole or final decision
maker in a disqualification dispute.400 Given the enormous number of
opportunities for this error throughout the federal and state court systems,401
erroneous disqualification decisions have the potential to create a serious
impact in actual cases decided throughout the United States every single day.
Moreover, when a jurist who reasonably appears to be biased erroneously
decides he or she need not step aside, that error negatively impacts public
confidence in the justice system as a whole. In fact, the appearance of an unfair
process may do more harm than the actual results reached in the particular
cases as people are more likely to accept unfavorable or unexpected results if
the decision making process is perceived as fair.402 Thus, preservation of

399. Id. at 884 (describing the timing, amount, and relative size of the campaign support
offered to Justice Benjamin as making it an “exceptional case.”).
400. About one third of the states, a total of nineteen, permit parties to use preemptory
challenges to remove one judge per proceeding. JAMES SAMPLE ET AL., FAIR COURTS: SETTING
RECUSAL STANDARDS, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE 7 (2008) available at http://www.brennan
center.org/publication/fair-courts-setting-recusal-standards; see also FLAMM, supra note 17, at
§26.1, 753 (noting that “a substantial minority of states have adopted statutes or court rules that
permit a party to seek judicial disqualification on a peremptory basis.”). However, in most of
those states, if the newly assigned jurist is biased the litigant must seek disqualification using the
usual methods, which include directing the request for recusal to the challenged jurist. Id.
401. Various state courts handled a total of 18,980,531 new civil and 20,437,849 new
criminal cases in 2010. Civil Caseloads Fell 3 Percent in 2010, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT,
http://www.courtstatistics.org/Civil/20121Civil.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2013); Criminal
Caseloads Continue to Decline, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/
Criminal/20121Criminal.aspx (last visited April 19, 2013). Of that number, 9,707,108 cases were
instituted in one of the 19 states that permit litigants to use preemptory challenges to remove a
judge. See SAMPLE ET AL., supra note 400, at 7. However, that leaves 29,711,272 cases brought
in the state courts that year in which parties’ rights to a fair trial before a fair tribunal were in the
hands of a jurist who could not be unbiased about his own biases if they were challenged.
402. Kees van den Bos et al., Evaluating Outcomes by the Means of the Fair Process
Effect:Evidence for Different Processes in Fairness and Satisfaction Judgments, 74 J. PERS. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1493, 1494 (1998) (“One of the most important discoveries in research on procedural
and distributive justice has been the finding that perceived procedural fairness positively affects
how people react to outcomes. This instance of the fair process effect has been one of the most
replicated findings in social psychology.”).
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public confidence in the judiciary demands that we refocus recusal reforms and
adopt procedural protections that remove the challenged jurist as the decision
maker—that is the best and perhaps only way we can ensure the litigants, the
press, and the public will perceive the process as fair and increase the chances
that actual justice is done.
V. CONCLUSION
In recent years, there has been increasing concern regarding the
impartiality of jurists—especially in controversial or otherwise high-profile
cases. This growing skepticism—by litigants, members of the bar and bench,
as well as the press and general public—poses a real threat to the legitimacy of
our court system, which derives its authority from the public confidence in
judicial integrity and impartiality. Therefore, the need to reform recusal
practice is real.
Accordingly, the underlying causes of such discontent must be identified
and addressed with the goals of individual justice and preservation of judicial
integrity in mind. As amply demonstrated in recent cases—including the
Caperton caper—one important cause of problem disqualification decisions is
the Bias Blind Spot. This cognitive illusion introduces systematic error that
results in seemingly incorrect disqualification decisions—which in turn lead to
a lack of confidence in the impartiality of individual jurists and the judiciary as
a whole. Thus, we must better understand the Bias Blind Spot and other
cognitive illusions that affect disqualification decisions and use those new
insights to reshape recusal reform. That means recusal reform must be
refocused on new procedures that remove the challenged jurist from the
disqualification decision—as that is the only sure way to counter the effects of
the Bias Blind Spot. While there may be other ways to help protect individual
litigants’ fundamental rights to a fair trial before a fair tribunal and preserve
public confidence in our courts—no other reform will as effectively address
the real problem and restore common sense to a system built on the maxim:
“no man shall be a judge in his own cause.”

